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A b stra ct
The primary contribution of this thesis is to develop a series of bioeconomic 
models and a decision framework to assess the outcomes of fisheries manage­
ment and provide policy recommendations. Using estimated parameters from 
different fisheries worldwide, biological, economic and social outcomes under 
different management scenarios were simulated and compared.
The thesis consists of three main essays focusing on issues in fisheries instru­
ment choice and the design of marine reserves. The first essay assesses and 
compares the economic and biological outcomes of different fisheries regula­
tions under a stochastic environment. One important issue in fisheries man­
agement is whether to control the inputs of resource users or the actual level 
of harvest when there are uncertainties in stock-recruitment and harvest-effort 
relationships. Using a dynamic programming model with parameter estimates 
from an actual fishery, this essay investigates to what extent tradeoffs can 
be made between the total catch level and the risk of overfishing, and also 
to what extent uncertainties in both the stock-recruitment and harvest-effort 
relationships affect the choice of total output versus total input controls.
The second and third essays address the issues of marine reserves. A number 
of previous studies have suggested that, with appropriate fisher and market 
incentives, the establishment of reserves will increase biological, economic and 
social benefits from fisheries. However, whether the use of reserves has ex-
iv
pected and desirable outcomes strictly depends on the marine reserve design, 
including the size, location, as well as duration of closure for fishing and con­
nectivity between reserve and harvested populations. The second essay of the 
thesis evaluates the impact of rotating a reserve over time. Using a stochastic 
bioeconomic model, we simulate the economic and biological benefits and com­
pare the outcomes between different management scenarios. In this essay, we 
also model the non-market value of marine reserves and analyse how the opti­
mal rotation rule changes in different forms of the non-market value function. 
The third essay discusses the connectivity and network structure of marine re­
serves. In this essay we develop a spatial bioeconomic model and showr how the 
connectivity between adjacent sites and the spatial heterogeneity in economic 
and biological variables affect the spillover effect between neighbouring sites.
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Chapter 1
In tro d u c tio n
O verview  o f th e  th esis
Many modern fisheries are in trouble worldwide and facing various issues and 
challenges, such as degradation of the ecosystem, depletion in fish stocks as 
well as increasing fishing capacity and decreasing economic profit (Pauly 1998; 
World Bank 2004; Worm et al. 2006). The primary causes of the problems 
are complex and inter-related. They include inappropriate incentives, high 
demand for limited resources, poverty and lack of alternatives, complexity and 
lack of knowledge, ineffective systems of governance, and the interactions of 
the fisheries sector with other sectors and the environment (FAO 2004). The 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) reported that about 25 per cent of 
the fish stocks monitored by FAO are either overfished, depleted, or recovering 
from depletion, while about half of the stocks are fully exploited and there is 
no room for expansion (FAO 2007).
Maintaining sustainable fisheries and restoring ecosystems in the long-run will 
guarantee a stable food supply, secure income sources as well as job opportu-
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nities and enhance amenity values of the coastal environment. Fisheries man­
agement is a complex system interacting with biological, economic and social 
behaviours. It is challenging but both public and private benefits from fisheries 
will be improved through institutional changes, including learning from the ex­
perience of successful fisheries, applying insights from science and managing 
market incentives with appropriate individual harvesting rights (World Bank 
2004; Grafton et al. 2006a; Hilborn 2007; Wilen 2006; Sanchirico & Wilen 
2007; Costello et al. 2008; Grafton et al. 2008).
The thesis focuses on issues in fisheries instrument choice and the design of 
marine reserves. The primary contribution of the thesis is to develop a series of 
bioeconomic models and a decision framework to assess outcomes of fisheries 
management and provide policy recommendations.
The analytical method employed in this thesis research is a stochastic dy­
namic optimisation approach. The developed models are solved using numeri­
cal methods. One advantage of using this method is that it allows us to specify 
the optimal time paths of the stochastic harvest, biomass and economic profit, 
in which the dynamic maximum economic yield (MEY) is achieved. At MEY, 
the discounted economic profit from fishing is maximised. Specifying sensible 
MEY levels is a fundamental issue in fisheries management, since not only the 
economic profit of a fishery is maximised but also the biomass at MEY could 
be greater than that at maximum sustainable yield (MSY) where the popu­
lation growth is maximised (Grafton et al. 2007). In this thesis, we compare 
the MEY levels as well as economic and biological benefits between different 
management strategies.
By contrast, a disadvantage of numerical methods is that the functional forms 
and parameters values have to be chosen and well-specified. Another potential 
problem with numerical methods is that the solutions are approximate. While
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in this thesis an extensive sensitivity analysis is undertaken for each study, 
more general qualitative structure of the results can be derived by analytical 
methods (Judd 1998). However, due to the complexity of the problems, it is 
often not possible to obtain the analytical solutions and numerical methods 
have to be employed.
Structure of the thesis
Following the introduction, this thesis is comprised of three main essays, which 
are based on joint research with Professor Tom Kompas and Professor R. 
Quentin Grafton. The first essay (Chapter 2) is based on a published article 
in Natural Resource Modeling (doi: 10.1111/j. 1939-7445.2008.00034.x). An 
important issue in natural resource management is whether to control the to­
tal effort or actual amount of resource exploitation. In this essay, we compare 
the management outcomes with a total allowable catch (TAC) and a total 
allowable effort (TAE) in a fishery under uncertainty. Using a dynamic pro­
gramming model with multiple uncertainties and estimated growth, harvest 
and effort functions from one of the world’s largest fisheries, the relative eco­
nomic and biological benefits of a TAC and TAE are compared and contrasted 
in a stochastic environment. This approach provides a decision and modeling 
framework to compare instruments and achieve desired management goals. A 
key finding of this essay is that neither instrument is always preferred in a 
world of uncertainty. Instrument choice is determined by the regulator’s risk 
aversion and weighting in terms of expected net profits and biomass, and the 
trade-offs in terms of expected values and variance.
In the second and third essays, we investigate the design of marine reserves. 
The creation of marine reserves has received increased attention by both fish-
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eries managers and scientists to mitigate failures in traditional fisheries man­
agement. In the second essay (Chapter 3), we develop a stochastic bioeconomic 
model to analyse a fisheries management strategy, marine reserves switching, 
incorporating the non-market value of reserves. In the switching strategy a 
non-fishing area is rotated from one site to another over time according to 
economic criteria. The simulation results show that, even if there are weak 
linkages between adjacent sites, the switching strategy is likely to maintain a 
high catch level as well as fish abundance. We also show that fixing a non­
fishing area at one site significantly decreases the total harvest if the linkage 
between adjacent sites is weak. With respect to the non-market value of re­
serves, we illustrate how the optimal switching rule changes with different 
characteristics of the non-market value.
The economic benefit of establishing a reserve depends strictly on fish dispersal 
between adjacent sites. The use of reserves is economically optimal if and only 
if the dispersal benefit from the reserve to harvested populations is greater than 
the cost of reductions in fishing waters from closing a fishing ground. In the 
third essay (Chapter 4), we examine the connectivity and network structure 
of marine reserves. The biological system is typically heterogeneous between 
different areas. Considering spatial characteristics in the management area 
makes the decision process more complex. In this essay we develop a spatial 
bioeconomic model, which incorporates a simple network structure of marine 
reserves. We then numerically solve and simulate the model using a feed­
back approximation method. A key finding is that weak connectivity between 
the reserve and harvested populations maintains the reserve population better 
than strong connectivity. In contrast, the strong connectivity averages the 
population density between protected and fishing areas faster and this results 
in greater economic returns. Another finding of this essay is that, with appro­
priate harvest limits, the dispersal benefit from reserves to adjacent fisheries is
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enhanced under a heterogeneous environment. This result suggests that, espe­
cially in a heterogeneous environment, a spatially explicit control of resource 
use outweighs a non-spatial one.
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Chapter 2
O u tp u t versus in p u t con tro ls u n d er 
u n certa in ty : T he  case of a fishery
In trod u ction
A fundamental issue when managing common-pool resources is whether to 
control the inputs or efforts of resource users or their actual level of use or har­
vest. In a deterministic world with perfect information and enforcement, both 
approaches generate identical outcomes. However, in a world of uncertainty 
the two methods of regulation differ in their effects just as prices and quantities 
differ in their impacts (Weitzman 1974; Jensen & Vestergaard 2003).1
We address the problem of how to manage renewable resources under uncer­
tainty by comparing two high-order methods of regulation: a total allowable 
catch (TAC) that limits the total harvest and a total allowable effort (TAE) 
that regulates the total level of effort expended by harvesters. Whether a 
TAC or TAE is preferred depends on the relative costs in monitoring2 and 
enforcement, the ability of fishers to substitute to non-ITQ species or unreg­
ulated fishing inputs, the uncertainty between fishing effort and harvest, and
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the uncertainty between the fish stock and the level of recruitment or growth 
in the fishery. In this paper, we confine our analysis to how the uncertainty 
affects the relative efficiency between TAC and TAE controls. Focusing on 
uncertainty, we show what circumstances favour TAC versus TAE controls.
A TAC provides direct control over harvesting mortality but only indirectly 
controls the effort expended by harvesters, whereas a TAE directly limits effort 
and only indirectly limits the amount harvested. In the case of TAE control, 
fishers may be able to substitute to unregulated inputs to offset the limits im­
posed by managers (Dupont 1991) but ineffective monitoring and enforcement 
will limit the ability of a TAC to control the harvests of fishers. Both ap­
proaches can be established as market-based instruments. In the case of total 
harvest (under TAC control) rights can be allocated as individual transferable 
harvesting quotas, whereas for total fishing effort (under TAE control), rights 
can be allocated in the form of individual transferable effort quotas.
The existing literature shows that the more uncertain is the relationship be­
tween current stocks and future recruitment, the more difficult it becomes to 
effectively set a TAC control. Similarly, the less predictable is the relationship 
between fishing inputs and level of catch, the less effective is a TAE control in 
obtaining the desired level of harvest (Danielsson 2002; Kompas et al. 2008). 
Although these are important insights, there remain several important ques­
tions to be answered when comparing the two instruments. For instance, to 
what extent can trade-offs be made between the total catch level and the risk 
of overfishing? To what extent do uncertainties in both the stock recruitment 
and harvest-effort relationships affect the choice of TAC versus TAE control? 
To what extent do comparisons of the instruments using cumulative density 
functions rather than expected values provide added insights about regulatory 
choice under uncertainty?3 To address these knowledge gaps, we employ a dy-
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namic optimisation model under multiple uncertainties with estimated growth, 
harvest and effort functions to simulate the economic and biological benefits 
under TAC and TAE controls.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, wre describe the results from 
previous modelling and describe our own “benchmark" bioeconomic model 
under multiple uncertainties. Section 2.3 describes the simulation method 
and estimates the model parameters using annual time series data from the 
skipjack fishery in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Numerical results, 
the trade-offs between TAC and TAE controls and the effects of uncertainty 
on the relative payoffs are explored in Section 2.4. A discussion of the results 
is given in Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 provides concluding remarks.
M odelling TAC and TAE controls
A small but important literature has developed over the relative merits of TAC 
and TAE controls in fisheries. Using a one-period model with uncertainty in 
terms of the current biomass, Hannesson and Steinshamn (1991) showed that 
the actual difference between a constant catch quota and constant effort is 
very small and the most important determinant of the relative profitability 
between them is the size of the stock effect in the harvest function. They also 
found that, as fishing cost decreases, the constant effort strategy becomes less 
profitable. Quiggin (1992) generalised the Hannesson and Steinshamn model 
and showed that there is a constant effort rule that generates a higher economic 
return for every constant catch rule. Danielsson (2002) subsequently developed 
a dynamic model to compare the relative efficiency of TAC and TAE controls 
and also added an additional level of uncertainty. He found that if the price 
elasticity of demand is low and the relative variability in the growth of the
8
stock to the catch per unit of effort is low, then a TAC is preferred to a TAE. 
However, TAE control is superior if the price elasticity of demand is high and 
there is high variability in the biomass relative to the catch per unit of effort. In 
an extension of Danielssoms work. Kompas et al. (2008) developed a dynamic 
model utilizing data from the Northern Tiger Prawn fishery of Australia. They 
find that given the estimated variability in the stock-recruitment relationship 
and catch per unit of effort that the use of a TAC is preferred in that fishery 
because both expected profits and the stock are higher at the steady state with 
a TAC and because the variation in the stock is always less with the TAC than 
TAE.4
We develop a bioeconomic model based on the models in Hannesson and Stein- 
shamn (1991) and Danielsson (2002). This permits us to compare and contrast 
our results to previous studies. To compare TAC and TAE controls we specify 
a monotonic harvest-effort relationship represented by the general form given 
in (2.1)
h, = f(E„ x t =  (2.1)
where ht is the harvest level at time t. The function /  is the determinis­
tic harvest function with the effort level Et, biomass level xt and a constant 
catchability coefficient q at time t. The parameters y l and 7 2 determine the 
importance of effort and stock levels in the harvest function. We define y2 as 
a stock effect. Given the assumption of dht/dE t > 0, the effort function, or 
the inverse of (2.1) is:
Et = f  l (hu x t) 
= g(ht , x t) (2 .2)
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Uncertainty is introduced by including random variables in the harvest and 
effort functions, respectively, i.e.,
ht = F(Et,xt, zth =  (2.3)
and
/  h \ 1/71
Et = G(ht ,xt zet ) =  - i j  (2.4)
\qxt /
where F  and G are respectively the harvest and effort functions with the 
random variables z£ and z\ that can be interpreted as ‘policy implementation 
errors', respectively in the TAE and TAC controls. In other words, is 
realized only when the TAE control is implemented, and z\ is realized only 
when the TAC control is used as an instrument.
We also specify a stock density dependent stochastic growth function as follows:
x t+i ~ x t = z frx t ( i  -  -  ht (2.5)
where r is the intrinsic growth rate, K  is the carrying capacity and a represents 
the skewness of the growth function. The change in the biomass over a period 
is the difference between the harvest level and the random growth in the stock. 
The random variable zf represents unknown variability in the growth in the 
biomass.
O bjective fu nction  and con stra in ts
For both TAC and TAE controls, we assume the regulator wishes to maximize 
the discounted net profits from fishing over an infinite time horizon and that 
the choice of which instrument to use cannot be changed. This assumption 
is not restrictive to our objective of comparing the relative biological and
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economic payoffs between the two fisheries instruments under various forms 
of uncertainty. Indeed, the two instruments can be more explicitly compared 
if the choice of instrument is not switched over time because our simulations 
will depend on the performance of only each instrument at a time.
The regulator’s optimization problem is to maximize the objective function 
(2.6) subject to constraints (2.7).
oo
max E V ^ ßtnt (2.6)
Et or ht
t= 0
subject to
xt+l -  Xt z9t rxt ( l  -  -  ht
x0 = x(0)
4  = z*(0), i e  {h, e, g}
(2.7)
where E is the mathematical expectation operator and ß  is the time discount 
factor. We define 7Tt as the net profit at time t and nt = p(ht)ht — cEt, where 
p(ht) is the inverse demand function and c is cost per unit of effort. In a 
TAG controlled fishery the regulator seeks to set an optimal harvest quota 
to maximize discounted net profits while under a TAE control the regulator 
sets the optimal effort quota. Our model disregards costs connected with 
monitoring and enforcement for the two different instruments and the ability 
of fishers to substitute to non-targeted species or unregulated inputs. As in 
Danielsson (2002), this allows us to focus on the effects of uncertainties in 
the stock-recruitment relationship and the harvest-effort relationship on the 
relative efficiency of TAC and TAE controls.
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The inverse demand function is specified as p(ht) = pht where 6 is the price
elasticity of the demand and p is a parameter. This specification is commonly 
used in bioecononrie modeling (Clark 1990) and can encompass various forms 
of the demand function depending on the parameter 6. For example, as ö —■> oo, 
p(ht) —> p and the price converges to a constant.
Our model implicitly indicates the importance of including both the population 
dynamics and different forms of uncertainty when the two fisheries instruments 
are compared. Given strict convexity of the harvest and concavity of the 
effort functions it follows from Jensen's inequality (Jehle & Reny 2001) that 
with a given stock level x = x*, F(Et, xj, E [zj1]) < E [F (Et, xj, zJ1)] and 
EG(Et, xj, zte) < G (ht, xj, E[zf]).5 This result implies that, with a fixed 
stock level, harvest control will yield a smaller catch and also a smaller effort 
level on average under the stochastic environment. However, the inequalities 
do not always hold because of the random variable that varies the biomass over 
time. For example, assume that F is increasing and G is decreasing function 
of the biomass and if , x*t > x t then F(Et, xj, E [2^ ]) > E [F (£), x t, 2^)] 
and EG (Et, xt zf) > G (ht, xj, E [2*]) can hold, respectively. Consequently a 
model that accounts for uncertainty in the growth function and the population 
dynamics over time will yield different results than a one period model.
The recursive form of the problem for each control variable is as follows. For 
TAE control it takes the following form:
V e(xt) = max (E [p • z^qE^x]2] -  cEt +  ßEVe (xt+i, z9t+l)) (2.8)
E t
and for TAC control it is:
(2.9)
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where the left hand side of the both equations (2.8) and (2.9) represents the 
value function, which is the maximum attainable objective function at time t. 
The right hand side of the equations has two parts. The first two terms are the 
expected net profit at time t (E [7rt]) and the last term ßEVl(xt+i, zf+1), i G 
(e, h}, is the discounted expected value function at time t + 1. The solution to 
the optimization problems in (2.8) and (2.9) yields, respectively, the optimal 
effort level and harvest level as a function of the stock level. As a result of the 
random variables the optimal levels of effort and harvest may not equal their 
actual levels.
W estern and Central Pacific Skipjack Fishery
The problem of instrument choice is applied to the Western and Central Pa­
cific skipjack fishery.6 It is one of the world's largest fisheries in terms of total 
harvest and generates landings of approximately 1.2 million metric tons per 
year (Langley et al. 2005). The fish are harvested primarily by purse seine ves­
sels that are highly capital intensive, although some skipjack is also caught by 
pole-and-line vessels. Overall, the fishery is characterized as a high volume but 
low value fishery per unit harvested (Barclay & Cartwright 2007). Although 
concerns have been raised about the sustainability of other tuna species (in 
particular bigeye), the biomass of skipjack still remains above its maximum 
sustained yield (Langley et al. 2005).
The management of the fishery is overseen by the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) — a regional fisheries management organi­
zation (Parris & Grafton 2006). The WCPFC acts on behalf of its member 
nations, which include coastal states and distant water fishing nations, and 
sets rules for its members that apply to both EEZ and the high-seas zones
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of the fishery. Its decisions are binding on member states 60 days after their 
adoption. Decisions are, in the first instance, to be made by consensus, and if 
this is not possible and only after all efforts to reach a decision by consensus 
have been exhausted, decisions can be made by a three-fourths majority of 
members.
To address concerns over higher than desired levels of fishing mortality for 
yellowfin, and especially bigeye tuna, members of the WCPFC have agreed to 
implement a type of TAE in the form of a vessel day scheme (VDS) for these 
tuna species that will restrict the number of days fished to an average over 
the 2001-2004 period. Although fishing effort for skipjack tuna is not directly 
controlled by the VDS, the scheme will also regulate the skipjack fishery as 
bigeye and yellowfin are important bycatches.
We employ Non-Linear Least Squares (NLS) estimation techniques to estimate 
the economic and biological parameters for our model by using annual time 
series data (i.e., catch and effort levels and a stock assessment estimate of 
biomass from 1972 to 2002) from the skipjack tuna purse seine fishery. The 
effort level is measured by days at sea fishing and searching for fish. Details 
of the estimation are provided in Table 2.1 for both the growth function and 
the harvest function. The intrinsic growth rate (r) and the parameter in the 
growth function (a) are estimated as r = 1.31 and a = 0.89. The goodness 
of the fit for the growth function is 0.58 and both parameters are statistically 
significant a,t 5 per cent level. The parameters in the harvest function are 
estimated as In(q) = —1.93, q l = 1.37 and q2 =  0.27. The goodness of the 
fit for the harvest function is 0.91. The catchability coefficient (q) and the 
parameter (7 I) are statistically significant at 5 percent level, but the stock 
effect (72) is not significant. Hence, we first set 72 = 0 to obtain base case 
results and then apply 72 = 0.27 for the sensitivity analysis of the stock effect
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Table 2.1 Estimation results of the growth function and the harvest function
Growth function
Parameter Coefficient t-statistics
r 1.31 8.50
(0.154)
a 0.89 2.25
(0.396)
Number of observation 30
R-squared 0.58
Harvest function
Parameter Coefficient t-statistics
In (q) -1.93 -1.97
(0.978)
yl 1.37 -16.71
(0.082)
72 0.27 -1.34
(0.202)
Number of observation 31
R-squared 0.91
P-value (F-statistics) 0.000
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
in the harvest function. For ease of exposition the carrying capacity (K ) is 
normalized to unity such that the biomass (x) represents density rather than 
actual weight of fish.
The price elasticity of demand and the cost parameter are obtained from 
Bertignac et al. (2000). The price elasticity is set at ö = 1.55 and the cost 
parameter is set at c = 14.5. Due to the lack of the adequate price data, the 
parameter in the inverse demand function (p) is initially set at 50 to ensure the 
existence of a unique steady state and the sensitivity analysis is undertaken. 
The base-case results are derived with the statistically significant estimated 
parameters and alternative parameters are applied for a sensitivity analysis. 
This allows us to investigate how the relative efficiencies between the two in­
struments change depending on the parameter values.
The stochastic factors zh, ze and z9 are specified as zl = 1 +  (2u — l)ez,
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i E {h, e, g}, where u is uniformly discretised with 10 grids (Sethi et al. 
2005). The term e determines the size of variations in the harvest and effort 
functions and growth function. It lies between 0 and 1, indicating from 0 per­
cent to 100 percent variations. It is important to note that this specification of 
the uncertainty implies that resource managers do not have exact information 
of the variation in the fish growth function and harvest and effort functions, 
but they do know about the source of uncertainty (which variables contain un­
predictable variations) and their distributions (how large the variations would 
be).
M o d e l re s u lts
To solve the recursive problems in (2.8) and (2.9) numerically, the value func­
tion iteration is utilized with evenly discretised 300 state space grids.' This 
is implemented using a numerical method in Matlab8 and two expectation 
terms are calculated. One is the expectation of the net returns for the ‘im­
plementation uncertainty’ (uncertainty in the harvest and effort functions) 
for all possible combinations of the state variables in the current (xt) and 
next period (xt+i). The other is the expected value of the value function 
for the ‘growth uncertainty’ (uncertainty in the growth function). At each 
iteration (updated from the previous iteration), the optimal policy rule func­
tion (4> : K+ x R++ —► Rt) is determined to maximize the objective function 
for each of the current states and the realization of the growth uncertainty 
(xt+i = $ (x t, z%)). The value function is iterated until a convergence criterion 
is satisfied (|| V l+l — V 1 ||< e-10 where the superscript l represents the number 
of iteration).
Using an optimal control rule derived from the converged value function (V*)
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Table 2.2 Biomass, net profits, harvest and effort 
at the steady state under a deterministic environment
Biomass Net profit Harvest Effort
TAC 0.946 11.040 0.092 0.720
TAE 0.946 11.040 0.092 0.720
Note: The carrying capacity is normalised and each variable has the following
domains: 0 < X < T 0 < 7 T <  11.040, 0 < h < 1 and 0 < E < 4.094.
with a given initial stock and tracking the Markov transitions in zh, ze and 
z9, 50,000 sets of time series are simulated for the optimal policy rule, stock 
level and economic returns for the TAC and TAE. These calculated values are 
restricted to 0 < h*t < K , 0 < ££, 0 < x*t < K  and 0 < 7r*, which imply that 
these variables are non-negative and the harvest and biomass cannot exceed 
the carrying capacity. Due to the normalization of carrying capacity (A'), 
the units of the biomass and harvest are defined as densities and the units 
of the effort and net profit become indexes. Consequently, the domain for 
the biomass and harvest is from 0 to 1 for both TAC and TAE controls, but 
the domains for the effort and net profit vary, depending on the instrument 
choice, the values of the parameters and the relative size of the uncertainty in 
the growth and harvest-effort functions.
The steady state values of the biomass, net profits, harvest and effort levels 
under the deterministic case, where eh = 0, ee = 0 and e9 — 0 are presented in 
Table 2.2.9 Without any stochasticity in the growth and harvest-effort func­
tions, both the optimal net profits and fish stock level are identical for the 
TAC and TAE. This is because under perfect information, enforcement and 
without any implementation error, the fishery manager can optimally control 
the harvest and effort level to maximize the discounted net profits by using 
either instrument.
TAC versus TAE control
In order to determine the superiority among the two fisheries instruments in a
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stochastic environment, a reference point must be assigned.10 This is because 
the superiority between the fisheries instruments may change, depending on 
what performance measures are used to assess (Francis and Shotton 1997). 
Kompas et al. (2008) use expected values to compare TAC and TAE controls. 
A potential problem with their approach, however, is that a single value of 
the expected value of the outcomes (net profits and biomass) does not provide 
a perfectly general reference point to compare the two instruments. In other 
words, expected values only provide a single reference point and analysing 
the distribution of possible outcomes would provide useful insights. In addi­
tion, through simulations we found that there is a relatively small difference 
between the expected values derived from the two control variables at given 
parameter values.11 We overcome this deficiency by constructing a cumulative 
density function (CDF) of the outcomes averaged over 50 periods to capture 
the difference in the two instruments.
The CDF describes the probability distribution of all possible outcomes and 
for each instrument is drawn from the 50.000 simulations. In each CDF figure, 
the point where CDF = 0.5 represents the median of the 50,000 simulations. 
The intersection of the two functions derived from each fisheries instrument 
represents the point at which the outcomes from the two instruments are iden­
tical. If the intersection is either below or above the point where CDF = 
0.5 then one of the instruments is superior to the other in the sense that one 
instrument’s outcome is greater than the other’s with a higher probability.
O p tim a l t im e  p a th
Figure 2.1 presents the sample optimal time path for the harvest and effort 
levels under two different scenarios.12 In the first case, the relative uncertainty 
in the growth function is small relative to the harvest-effort function (e5 =  0.01, 
eh =  0.05 and ee =  0.05), but in the second case there is much more uncertainty
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Figure 2.1 O ptim al sam ple tim e paths for harvest and fishing effort 
in the stochastic environm ent
2.1.1 Optimal sample time path for harvest 
(<e9 =  0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee = 0.05)
Time
(domain: 0 < h < 1)
2.1.3 Optimal sample time path for harvest 
(e9 = 0.05, eh =  0.01 and ee = 0.01)
2.1.2 Optimal sample time path for effort 
(e9 = 0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee = 0.05)
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2.1.4 Optimal sample time path for effort
(e9 = 0.05, eh = 0.01 and ee =  0.01)
(domain: 0 < h < 1)
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Figure 2.2 C D F  o f  average n et profit w ith  d ifferen t s ize  o f  u n certa in ties  (y2  =  0)
2.2.1 e9 = 0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee =  0.05 2.2.2 e9 = 0.05, eh = 0.01 and ee =  0.01
Average net profits over 50 periods
(domain:
0 <  n TAC < 11.59 
0 <  7tt a e  <  11.42 '
Average net profits over 50 periods
(domain: 0 < 7tt a c  < 11.15 0 < n TAE <  11.12 ’
in the growth function relative to the harvest-effort function (e9 — 0.05, eh =  
0.01 and ee =  0.01).13 The dotted line is the optimal time path under the 
deterministic environment with no uncertainty (e9 = 0, eh =  0 and ee =  0). 
When the uncertainty in the harvest and effort functions is relatively large, the 
harvest level with the TAE has a greater variation than that with the TAC, 
but the variation in the level of effort is smaller than with the TAC. This is 
because the TAC directly controls the harvest level, whereas the harvest in the 
TAE is indirectly determined by setting the optimal effort quota. Figure 2.1 
also shows that the variations in the harvest and effort levels are greater when 
the uncertainty in the harvest-effort function is relatively large. Moreover, the 
time paths under the stochastic environment, especially the harvest with the 
TAC and the effort level with the TAE, tend to be lower than those under 
the deterministic case. This is because with a stochastic environment and a 
strictly concave profit function, the harvest and effort quotas are set to a lower 
level to avoid overfishing.
Figures 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 illustrate how the relative economic payoffs between the 
two instruments changes according to the relative size of the uncertainty. If the 
uncertainty in the growth function is small (Figure 2.2.1: e9 =  0.01, eh =  0.05 
and ee =  0.05), the relative economic payoff favours the TAC control. This
20
Figure 2.3 C D F  o f average b iom ass w ith  d ifferen t s ize  o f u n certa in ties  (72 =  0)
2.3.1 e9 = 0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee =  0.05 2.3.2 e9 =  0.05, eh = 0.01 and ee =  0.01
Average stock level over 50 periodsAverage stock level over 50 periods
(domain 0 < x < 1) (domain 0 <  x < 1)
is shown in Figure 2.2.1 by the intersection of the TAC and TAE CDFs at a 
point greater than 0.5. By contrast, if the uncertainty in growth function is 
large (Figure 2.2.2: e9 =  0.05, eh =  0.01 and ee — 0.01), the TAE has a higher 
payoff than the TAC with a higher probability as shown by the intersection 
of the CDFs at a point less than 0.5. The greater is the variation in the 
harvest-effort function then larger is the variation in the harvest level with a 
TAE control that, in turn, contributes to over- or under fishing. On the other 
hand, the greater is the variation in the biomass growth function, the larger is 
the regulator’s error in predicting the following period’s stock level, such that 
TAC control is set at either at too high or too low a level thereby reducing its 
efficacy as a policy instrument.
Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 provide a comparison between TAC and TAE controls 
in terms of the average biomass.14 In both cases, a TAC control delivers a 
higher average biomass. The larger the variation in the biomass growth func­
tion relative to the variation in the harvest- effort function, the larger is the 
average biomass associated with TAC control compared to TAE control. This 
is because with a relatively high realization in the biomass a TAC control in­
creases the likelihood of harvesting less than what is optimal relative to a TAE 
control. As a result, the TAC maintains on average a greater biomass than
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Figure 2.4 CDF of average net profit with different size of uncertainties (72 = 0.27)
2.4.1 e9 =  0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee =  0.05 2.4.2 e9 = 0.05, eh = 0.01 and ee =  0.01
Average net profits over 50 periods Average net profits over 50 periods
, ,  . 0 < n TAC < 11.59 , , ,  . 0 < ttt a c  < 11.15 N(domain: Q <  ^ TAE< u  )^ (domain: Q < < u  n  )
Figure 2.5 CDF of average biomass with different size of uncertainties (72 = 0.27)
2.5.1 e9 = 0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee =  0.05 2.5.2 e9 =  0.05, eh =  0.01 and ee =  0.01
Average stock level over 50 periods Average stock level over 50 periods
(domain 0 < x < 1) (domain 0 < x < 1)
TAE control. This result is consistent with that in Figure 2.1. Because of the 
curvature of the profit function, the optimal time path for the harvest in the 
TAC control is, on average, lower than that in the TAE control.
S en sitiv ity  analysis: stock  effect
The estimated value of the stock or biomass dependency parameter, 72 , in the 
harvest function was not significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level 
of significance. However, the ‘stock effect' has been shown to be important in 
some fisheries so we assess the sensitivity of the results to changes in this 
parameter.15 Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show how the results change when there is a 
weak link (72 =  0.27) between the harvest and the biomass. Although there is
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Figure 2.6 C D F  o f  average n et profit w ith  d ifferen t price e la s t ic it ie s  (72 =  0)
2.6.1 eg =  0.01, eh =  0.05 and ee =  0.05 
<5=1.3 <5=1.55 <5 =  2.1
0 < nTAC <  18.99 0 < nTAC <  11.59
(domain: ) (domain: )
0 < 7ttae  < 18.85 0 < tttae  < 11.42
0 <  nTAC <  4.47 
(domain: )
0 < tttae  <  4.30
<5 =  1.3
2.6.2 e9 =  0.05, eh =  0.01 and ee =  0.01
(5 =  1.55 6 =  2.1
Average net profits over 50 periods
(domain:
0 <  nTAC <  18.63
0 <  7TTAE < 18.61^
Average net profits over 50 periods
(domain:
0 <  7xTAC <  11.15 
0 <  n TAE < 11 . 12 '
Average net profits over 50 periods
0 <  7ttac  <  4.03 
(domain: )
V 0 < nTAE <  4.00;
not a substantial change in the results, the introduction of stock effect favours 
TAE control versus TAC control in terms of net profits because a smaller level 
of effort is needed to maintain the same level of harvest. Given a smaller level 
of effort, there is less variation in the harvest level in the TAE, and it is less 
likely there will be over- or underfishing.
S en sitiv ity  analysis: price e la stic ity  o f dem and
To investigate how the price elasticity affects the result, different values of the 
price elasticity of demand (<5 =  1.3 and (5 =  2.1) are applied. The simulation 
results are shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7. Again, the difference to the base-case 
results in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 are not large. However, Figure 2.6 does show 
that as the price elasticity increases, the payoffs in terms of net profits increase 
for TAC versus TAE control. This is because the more responsive is the price
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Figure 2.7 CDF of average biomass with different price elasticity (y2 =  0)
2.7.1 =  0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee =  0.05
6 = 1.3 6 = 1.55 6 = 2.1
(domain: 0< x  < 1 ) (domain: 0< x  <  1) (domain: 0< x  < 1)
2.7.2 e9 = 0.05, eh =  0.01 and ee =  0.01 
6 = 1.3 5 = 1 .5 5 6 =  2.1
Average stock level over 50 periods Average stock level over 50 periods
... /..
Average stock level over 50 periods
(domain: 0< x < 1 ) (domain: 0< x  <  1) (domain: 0< x < 1)
to change in the harvest the less desirable is a TAE control as it only indirectly 
controls the harvest.
S en sitiv ity  analysis: harvesting  costs
Alternative cost parameters (c = 8 and c = 2.4) are applied to analyse how the 
results alter with changes in harvesting costs. The simulations are presented 
in Figures 2.8 and 2.9.16 The results are very different to Figures 2.2 and 2.3.17 
As the cost parameter decreases, the cost of fishing becomes lower and the 
optimal harvest level increases. A larger harvest, however, increases the risk 
of overfishing, and because the TAE control only indirectly limits the harvest, 
it is optimal to have a lower level of fishing effort to avoid such an outcome. 
By contrast, the TAC control limits the harvest level directly and there is 
less need to compensate with lower harvests if it can be controlled directly. 
Consequently, the TAE is relatively favoured in terms of the average payoffs
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Figure 2.8 C D F  o f  average n et profit w ith  d ifferen t co st p aram eters (7 2  =  0)
2.8.1 e9 = 0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee =  0.05 
c =  14.5 c = 8 c = 2.4
(domain:
0 <  n TAC <  11.59. 
0 < ttt a e  <  11.42
0 < 7rTAC <  20.34 
) (domain: <  T / l , ~  )
0 <  n TAC <  40.67 
(domain: )
0 < tt1a e  < 40.52
14.5
2.8.2 e9 =  0.05, eh = 0.01 and ee =  0.01 
c — 8 2.4
Average net profits over 50 periods
0 < n TAC < 11.15 
(domain: )
0 < ttt a e  <  11.12
Average net profits over 50 periods
0 <  7tt a c  < 19.56 
(domain: „ . „ )
0 < 7rTAE < 19.51
Average net profits over 50 periods
(domain:
0 <  n TAC 
0 < nTAE
< 40.27
< 40.25
F igure 2.9 C D F  o f  average b iom ass w ith  d ifferen t co st param eters (72  — 0)
2.9.1 e9 =  0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee =  0.05 
c =  14.5 c =  8 c = 2.4
Average stock level over 50 periodsAverage stock level over 50 periods Average stock level over 50 periods
(domain: 0< x < 1 ) (domain: 0< x < 1) (domain: 0< x < 1)
2.9.2 e9 -  0.05, eh = 0.01 and ee =  0.01 
c =  14.5 c =  8 c =  2.4
Average stock level over 50 periods Average stock level over 50 periods Average stock level over 50 periods
(domain: 0< x < 1 ) (domain: 0< x  < 1) (domain: 0< x < 1)
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and generates a higher biomass to the TAC relative to the base case scenario.
Our finding contrasts witli the findings of Hannesson and Steinshamn(1991) 
who show that as fishing cost decreases, the constant effort strategy becomes 
relatively less profitable than the constant catch management. Their result 
comes from the fact that they employed a one period model with a strictly 
convex cost function. By contrast, in our dynamic model with time varying 
biomass, this relationship does not always hold. For instance, if the constant 
effort strategy conserves a greater biomass, then the fishing cost with the 
TAC could be greater than that with the TAE with a stock effect. Thus, 
in our results, as fishing costs decrease, the TAE level is reduced as it only 
indirectly controls harvest and the probability of overfishing increases with 
higher optimal harvests. Consequently, the harvest and effort levels with the 
TAE become relatively smaller than those with the TAC leading to higher 
average biomass and net profits relative to TAC control.
S en sitiv ity  analysis: price effect
A similar result to the cost effect is obtained with higher price parameters of 
fish (p = 85 and p  =  100) but with the same price elasticity of demand, as 
shown in Figures 2.10 and 2.11. As the value of a landed fish increases, the 
optimal harvest level rises. At a larger harvest the risk of overfishing becomes 
greater, and because a TAE only controls the harvest indirectly, it is optimal 
to limit total effort more than total harvest. This is equivalent to a decrease in 
the cost parameter and favours TAE control relative to TAC control in terms 
of average net profits and the biomass.
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F igure 2.10 C D F  o f average n et profit w ith  d ifferen t price p aram eters (72  =  0)
2.10.1 e9 =  0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee =  0.05 
p = 50 p = 85 p = 100
Average net profits over 50 periods Average net profits over 50 periods
0 <  ttt a c  <  11.59 0 < n TAC < 32.55
(domain: ) (domain: )
0 < ttt a e  < 11.42 0 < nTAE < 32.07
Average net profits over 50 periods
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0 < n TAE
< 44.65
< 44.00 )
2.10.2 e9 =  0.05, eh =  0.01 and ee
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Average net profits over 50 periods
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0.01
p =  100
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Figure 2.11 C D F  o f  average biometss w ith  d ifferen t price param eters (7 2  =  0)
2.11.1 e® =  0.01, eh = 0.05 and ee =  0.05 
p =  50 p — 85 p =  100
Average stock level over 50 periods
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27
D iscu ss io n
The results suggest that, in terms of uncertainty considerations, TAC con­
trol is likely to be preferred versus TAE for the "Western and Central Pacific 
skipjack tuna fishery. This is because there is a well-defined and estimated 
growth function for the fishery and considerable uncertainty in terms of the 
harvest-effort relationship. For instance, there have been large and unexpected 
increases in catch per unit of effort in recent years in this fishery (Barclay & 
Cartwright 2007). Consequently, Figures 2.2.1 and 2.3.1 (corresponding to 
e9 =  0.01, eh =  0.05 and ee =  0.05) are likely to be a better reflection of the 
differences between TAC and TAE control in the skipjack fishery than Figures 
2.2.2 and 2.3.2 (corresponding to e9 =  0.05, eh =  0.01 and £e =  0.01). As a 
result, Figures 2.2.1 and 2.3.1 imply that a TAC control is preferred over a 
TAE control as it generates both highest expected profits and higher expected 
stock levels. Changes in the various parameters (stock effect, price elasticity, 
cost parameter, price effect), however, change the relative desirability of the 
instruments. Nevertheless, using a price elasticity of 1.55 and a cost param­
eter of 14.5 obtained from Bertignac et al. (2000), expected net profits still 
remain higher with a TAC and this result is reinforced the lower is the price 
of skipjack, which has declined in real terms since the 1980s (Asian Develop­
ment Bank 2003). Given that the skipjack fishery is not overexploited and its 
biomass is above its maximum sustained yield and the expected net profits is 
the primary economic consideration of the purse seine fleet, it would seem that 
a TAC control is, on the basis of our uncertainty analysis, preferred relative 
to TAE control for this fishery.
Our findings also contribute to the general literature on instrument choice. By 
examining multiple uncertainties in an actual fishery using a dynamic model, 
we show how a decision-making framework in the form of CDFs can be uti-
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lized in fisheries management. This approach also offers additional insights. 
For instance, Hannesson and Steinshamn (1991, p. 88), argue that the most 
important factor that determines whether a total harvest or total effort control 
is preferred is the size of the stock effect in the harvest function. Our analysis 
suggests that other factors, such as the level of the costs and price parameters, 
are equally important in determining the preferred instrument.
Danielsson (2002) provides the most complete analytical set of results regard­
ing instrument choice but to obtain his finding he was limited to examining the 
case of only one form of uncertainty—in either the biomass growth function 
or in terms of catch per unit of effort but not both. By employing numerical 
methods we are able to examine multiple uncertainties. We stress, however, 
that our results support the findings of Danielsson (2002) regarding relative 
size of ‘growth' and ‘implementation' uncertainties on instrument choice. We 
also show that modelling several forms of uncertainty is required to make ade­
quate comparisons between, the instruments. The only other study to employ 
a similar approach is Kompas et al. (2008), which they apply to the Northern 
Tiger Prawn fishery of Australia. However, they do not undertake sensitivity 
analysis in terms of cost and price parameters or the price elasticity of de­
mand and restrict themselves to comparisons of expected values and standard 
deviations in the biomass and net profits.
We find that TAC control has the advantage that it results in a lower variation 
in both biomass and net profits than does a TAE control. However, we also find 
there are tradeoffs between the harvest level and the risk of overfishing. If the 
regulator sets a high harvest level, either with a TAC or TAE, the expected net 
profits will also increase for a given sufficient stock level. On the other hand, 
higher harvests increase the risk of overfishing and then cause a less optimal 
biomass level that lowers future net profits. The alternative of harvesting less
29
today reduces the possibility of overfishing but at the cost of net profits today.
Overall, our analysis provides a decision framework to balance higher expected 
net profits with lower expected biomass levels and shows how TAC and TAE 
controls generate different outcomes. Indeed, a key finding of our modelling 
is that the larger is the harvest level, the greater is the variance in the net 
profits associated with TAE versus TAC control, but the higher is the expected 
biomass.
In our modelling, we fix the instrument choice at the beginning period and do 
not allow for a policy switch. However, even without policy switching, we show 
that as costs and prices change in a fishery, the relative preference for a given 
method of control may substantially change. This suggests the possibility that 
a portfolio of instruments could be applied to optimize the management of 
fisheries. In such a scenario, fishers could be allocated both shares of a TAE 
and a TAC. Only one of the instruments would be binding in any period, but 
it would allow the option to switch into a different policy regime as conditions 
in the fishery changed. For example, it is planned in the Eastern and Tuna 
Billfish fishery in Australia that fishers will be assigned shares (denominated in 
hooks) of a TAE before the end of 2008. However, they could subsequently be 
allocated individual harvesting rights as a share of TAC should circumstances 
change to favour the use of individual transferable harvesting rights.
C onclu d in g  rem arks
One of the most difficult aspects of managing fisheries is to cope with the in­
herent uncertainties in stock- recruitment and the harvest-effort relationships. 
Depending on the relative magnitudes of the uncertainties in these relation­
ships and the price and cost parameters, managers can trade-off expected net
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profits and biomass levels with their variability.
Using parameter estimates from one of the world’s largest fisheries, the Western 
and Central Pacific skipjack tuna fishery, we analyse multiple uncertainties and 
compare the use of a total harvest control with a total effort control. Using a 
decision framework not previously used in this context, we compare the payoffs 
of the two instruments using cumulative density functions. Under most likely 
parameter values and given the fishery is not currently overexploited, a total 
harvest control is favoured to a total effort control if expected net profits are of 
primary consideration. Nevertheless, a key finding is that neither instrument 
is always preferred in a world of uncertainty and that a regulator’s weighting 
in terms of the importance of expected net profits versus expected biomass 
and trade-offs in terms of expected values and variance, will determine the 
instrument choice.
Our analysis shows that as harvesting costs decrease and the price of fish 
rises, the desirability of total effort control increases relative to that of a total 
harvest control in terms of expected net profits and biomass. Overall, our 
results provide a decision and modelling framework for regulators to compare 
instruments and to achieve desired management goals.
31
A p p e n d ix
Matlab code for TAE
%%%% tae.m
%%%%
%%%% This program solves a dynamic bioeconomie model
%%%% by value function iteration
%%%% Policy instrument: total allowable effort (TAE)
%%%%
close all 
clear all 
clc
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 1. SET MODEL PARAMETERES
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
beta = 0.9; % discount rate
nl =  1.37; % gamma 1
n2 =  0: % gamma 2
n3 =  1.55; % price elasticity of demand
c =  14.5; % cost parameter
pO = 50; % price parameter
qt =  .145; % catchability coefficient
r =  1.31; % intrinsic growth rate
K =  1; % carrying capacity
alpha =  0.89; % parameter in the growth function
% OTHER REQUIRED PARAMETERS 
maxit =  1000; % max number of iteration 
g =  300: % number of grid 
crit =  le-10; % tolerance criterion 
T =  61; % number of periods
% UNCERTAINTY IN THE GROWTH FUNCTION 
qg =  10; % size of shock vector 
epg =  0.01; % variance of uncertainty 
ug -  linspace(0,l,qg);
% UNCERTAINTY IN THE HARVEST/EFFORT FUNCTION 
qh =  10; % size of shock vector
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eph =  0.05; % variance of uncertainty 
uh =  linspace(0,l,qh);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 2. DISCRETIZATION OF FISH STATE SPACE
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
xO = .5*K: % initial state
xmin = 0; % min of the state
xmax =  K; % max of the state
x =  [xmin+(0:g-2)*(xmax-xmin)/(g-1) xmax]’;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 3. CONSTRUCT EXPECTED NET PROFIT SET
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% CALCULATE THE EXPECTED NET PROFIT 
% FOR ALL POSSIBLE (x(t),x(t+l)) PAIRS
d =  ones(l,g);
zg =  1 + (2*ug - l)*epg;
zg =  zg’*d;
zg =  zg(:);
fg =  ones(l.g*qg);
zh = 1 + (2*uh- l)*eph;
zh =  d’*zh;
zh =  zh(:);
zh -  fg’*zh’;
clear uh ug d fg
eg =  ones(Lqg); 
xaux =  eg’*x’; 
xaux = xaux(:); 
clear eg
eh =  ones(l.qh); 
xaux2 =  x*eh; 
xaux2 =  xaux2(:); 
clear eh
fg =  ones(l,g*qg); 
fh =  ones(l,g*qh);
W1 =  max(zh.*((r*zg.*xaux.*(l - xaux/K )/alpha + xaux)*fh-... 
fg’*xaux2’),0); % harvest 
clear zg xaux2
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% W1 (HARVEST) CANNOT EXCEED K
[m,n] =  find(Wl > K);
siz =  size(m);
for j =  l:siz
W l(m (j,l),n(j.l)) =  K:
end
p =  pO*(Wl)A(-l/n3); % price 
R =  p.*Wl; % total revenue
W2 =  ((W l./zh)./(qt*(xaux*fh)/n2))A (l/nl); % effort 
clear W1 xaux fg fh zh
C =  c*W2; % total cost 
clear W2
nr = max(R - C, le-8); % net profit 
clear R C
fh =  ones(l,g*qh); 
d =  ones(l,g); 
piaux =  1/qh; 
piaux =  piaux*fh’; 
pih — piaux* d; 
clear d fh piaux;
Ih -  eye(g);
Eh -  Ih; 
for i =  1: qh-1 
Eh =  [Eh; Ih]; 
end
clear Ih
Eh -  Eh.*pih: 
clear pih
nr =  nr*Eh; % expected net profit 
clear Eh
eg =  ones(Eqg); 
piaux =  1/qg; 
piaux — piaux*eg’; 
pig =  piaux* eg; 
clear eg piaux;
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Ig -  eye(qg);
Eg =  Ig; 
for i—l:g-l 
Eg= [Eg;Ig]; 
end
clear Ig
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 4. VALUE FUNCTION ITERATION
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% INITIAL GUESS OF THE VALUE FUNCTION 
VO =  zeros(g*qg,l);
% ITERATION 
iconv — 0; 
it =  1;
while (iconv==0 && it<maxit)
[Vl.G] =  max((nr+beta*(Eg*(pig*reshape(VO,qg,g))))’); 
VI =  V I’;
G =  G’;
error (it) =  norm(VO-Vl);
if norm(V0-Vl)<crit
iconv =  1;
end
VO -  VI; 
it =  it+1;
end
clear nr
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 5. SIMULATING ’M’ SETS OF TIME SERIES
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
G =  reshape(G,qg,g);
M = 50000; % the number of simulations 
ug =  linspace(0,Uqg); 
zg = 1 + (2*ug’ - l)*epg;
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uh =  linspace(O.Lqh); 
zh= 1 + (2*uh’ - l)*eph;
% DEFINE VARIABLES 
thetagm =  zeros(T.M); 
thetahm = zeros(T,M); 
xtm =  zeros (T+1,M); 
xtbarm =  zeros(T+l,M); 
etm =  zeros (T,M); 
htbarm =  zeros (T,M); 
htm — zeros (T,M); 
ctm =  zeros(T,M); 
ptm — zeros (T,M); 
nrtm= zeros(T.M); 
indm = zeros (T+1,M); 
indbarm = zeros(T+l,M);
eh =  ones(Lqh);
piaux =  1/qh: % assume uniform distribution 
piaux =  piaux*eh'; 
pih =  piaux*eh; 
clear eh piaux;
% SIMULATION 
for i =  1:M
% CHASE THE MARKOV TRANSITIONS 
jg =  l;
iconvg =  0; 
auxg — rand;
while (jg < =  qg && iconvg = =  0)
if auxg < jg/qg
auxg2 -  jg;
iconvg =  1;
end
jg =  jg+ i;
end
thetagm(:,i) =  shock (auxg2,pig,T)’; 
jh =  1;
iconvh =  0; 
auxh =  rand;
while (jh < =  qh && iconvh = =  0)
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if auxh < jh/qh 
auxh2 =  jh; 
iconvh =  1; 
end
jh = jh+1; 
end
thetahm(:,i) = shock (anxh2, pill. T )’;
[aux.indm(l,i)] =  min(x<xO); 
xtm(l,i) =  x(indm(l,i));
for j = 1:T
[aux, indm(j.i)] =  min(x<xtm(j,i)); 
indbar(j+l,i) = G(thetagm(j.i),indm(j.i));
xtbarm(j+l,i) =  x(indbar(j+l.i));
htmbar(j,i) =  max(zg(thetagm(jd))*r*xtm(j,i)*(l - xtm(j,i)/K)~alpha + 
xtm(j,i)
xtbarm(j+l,i), 0);
etm(j.i) =  (htmbar(j,i)/(qt*xtm(j,i)~n2))"(l/nl); 
htm(j,i) =  zh(thetahm(j,i))*qt*etm(j,i) nl*xtm(j,i) n2; 
xtm(j+l,i) =  r*zg(thetagm(j,i))*xtm(j,i)*...
(1 - xtm(j.i)/K)"alpha - htm(j.i) 4- xtm(j.i)-, 
ptm(j,i) =  p0*htm(j,i) (-l/n3); 
nrtm(j,i) =  ptm(j,l)*htm(j,i) - c*etm(j,i);
% EXCLUDE NEGATIVE NP
if nrtm(j.i) < 0 
nrtm(j.i) =  0; 
htm(j,i) =  0; 
etm(jq) =  0;
xtm(j+l,i) =  r*zg(thetagm(jd))*xtm(j,i)*...
(1 - xtm(j,i)/K) alpha + xtm(j,i); 
end
end
end
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M a tla b  co d e  for TAC
%%%% tac.m
%%%%
% %%% This program solves a dynamic bioeconomic model
%%%% by value function iteration
%%%% Policy instrument: total allowable catch (TAC)
%%%%
close all 
clear all 
clc
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 1. SET MODEL PARAMETERES
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
beta = 0.9; % discount factor
nl = 1.37; % gamma 1
n2 =  0; % gamma 2
n3 = 1.55; % price elasticity of demand
c =  14.5; % cost parameter
pO =  50; % price parameter
qt =  .145; % catchability coefficient
r =  1.31; % intrinsic growth rate
K = 1; % carrying capacity
alpha = 0.89; % parameter in the growth function
% OTHER REQUIRED PARAMETERS 
maxit =  1000; % max number of iteration 
g =  300; % number of grid 
crit =  le-10; % tolerance criterion 
T = 61; % number of periods
% UNCERTAINTY IN THE GROWTH FUNCTION 
qg =  10; % size of shock vector 
epg =  0.01; % variance of uncertainty 
ug =  linspace(0,l,qg);
% UNCERTAINTY IN THE HARVEST/EFFORT FUNCTION
qh =  10; % size of shock vector
eph =  0.05; % variance of uncertainty
uh = linspace(0,Uc[li);
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 2. DISCRETIZATION OF FISH STATE SPACE
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
xO = .5*K; % initial state 
xmin =  0; % min of the state 
xmax =  K; % max of the state
x =  [xmin+(0:g-2)*(xmax-xmin)/(g-1) xmax]’; % discretize the state
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 3. CONSTRUCT EXPECTED NET PROFIT SET
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% CALCULATE THE EXPECTED NET PROFIT 
% FOR ALL POSSIBLE (x(t),x(t+l)) PAIRS
d =  ones(l,g);
zg =  1 +  (2*ug - l)*epg;
zg= zg’*d:
zg =  zg(:);
clear ug fg d
eg =  ones(Lqg); 
xaux =  eg’*x’; 
xaux =  xaux(:); 
clear eg
ee = ones(Lqe); 
xaux2 =  x*ee; 
xaux2 =  xaux2(:); 
clear ee
fg =  ones(l,g*qg); 
fe =  ones(l,g*qe);
W1 =  max((r*zg.*xaux.*(l - xaux/K )/alpha +  xaux)*fe ...
- fg’*xaux2,,0); % harvest 
clear zg xaux2
% W1 (HARVEST) CANNOT EXCEED K
[m,n] =  find(Wl >K);
siz =  size(m);
for j =  l:siz
W l(m (j,l),n(j,l)) =  K;
end
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p =  p0*(Wl).~(-l/n3); % price
R =  p.*Wl; % total revenue
d =  ones(l,g);
ze =  1 + (2*ue- l)*epe;
ze =  d’*ze;
ze =  ze(:);
ze -  fg’*ze’;
clear ue d fg
W2 = ze.*((W l./(qt*(xaux*fe)/n2)).~(l/nl)); % effort 
clear W1 xaux fe
C =  c*W2; % total cost clear W2
nr =  max(R - C, le-8); % net profit 
clear R C
fe =  ones(l,g*qe); 
d =  ones(l,g); 
piaux = 1/qe; 
piaux =  piaux* fe’; 
pie =  piaux* d: 
clear d fe piaux;
Ie =  eye(g);
Ee — Ie; 
for i =  l:qe-l 
Ee =  [Ee;Ie]; 
end
clear Ie 
Ee =  Ee.*pie;
nr =  nr*Ee; % expected net profit 
clear Ee pie
eg -  ones(l,qg); 
piaux =  1/qg; 
piaux = piaux*eg'; 
pig =  piaux*eg; 
clear eg piaux;
Ig =  eye(qg);
Eg =  Ig;
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for i= l:g-l 
Eg=[Eg;Ig]; 
end
clear Ig
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 4. VALUE FUNCTION ITERATION
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% INITIAL GUESS OF THE VALUE FUNCTION 
VO = zeros(g*qg,l);
% ITERATION 
iconv =  0; 
it =  1;
while (iconv==0 && it<maxit)
[VI,G] =  max((nr+beta*(Eg*(pig*reshape(VO,qg,g))))’);
VI =  V I’;
G =  G’;
error (it) =  norm(VO-Vl):
if norm(V0-Vl)<crit
iconv = 1;
end
VO = VI; 
it =  it+1;
end
clear nr
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 5. SIMULATING ’M’ SETS OF TIME SERIES
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
G -  reshape(G,qg,g);
M = 50000; % the number of simulations 
ug = linspace(O.l.qg); 
zg — 1 V (2*ug’ - l)*epg; 
ue =  linspace(0,l.qe); 
ze— 1 + (2*ue’ - l)*epe;
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% DEFINE VARIABLES 
thetagm = zeros(T.M); 
thetaem = zeros(T,M); 
xtm =  zeros (T+1,M); 
etm =  zeros (T,M); 
htm =  zeros(T,M); 
ctm =  zeros (T, AI); 
ptm =  zeros (T, AI); 
nrtm= zeros(T,AI); 
indm =  zeros (T +l, AI);
ee = ones(l,qe); 
piaux =  1/qe; 
piaux — piaux* ee’; 
pie =  piaux*ee; 
clear ee piaux;
% SIAIULATE
for i =  1: AI
% CHASE THE MARKOV TRANSITIONS 
jg =  i;
iconvg =  0; 
auxg =  rand;
while (jg < =  qg && iconvg = =  0)
if auxg < jg/qg
auxg2 =  jg;
iconvg =  1;
end
jg =  jg+l;
end
thetagm(:,i) =  shock(auxg2,pig,T)’;
je =  1; 
iconve =  0; 
auxe =  rand;
while (je < =  qe && iconve = =  0)
if auxe < je/qe
auxe2 =  je;
iconve — 1;
end
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je = je+1; 
end
thetaem(:,i) = shock(auxe2,pie,T),;
[aux,indm(l,i)] = min(x<xO); 
xtm(l,i) =  x(indm(l,i));
for j= l:T
[aux, indm(j,i)] =  min(x<xtm(j,i)); 
indbar(j+l,i) =  G(thetagm(j,i),indm(j,i));
xtm(j+l,i) =  x(indbar(j+l.i));
htm(j,i) =  max(zg(thetagm(j,i))*r*xtm(j,i)*(l - xtm(j,i)/K)Aalpha +
xtm(j,i) - •••
xtm(j+l,i), 0);
etm(j,i) =  ze(thetaem(j,i))*((htm(j,i)/(qt*xtm(j,i) n2))~(l/nl)); 
ptm(j,i) -  p0*htm(j,i) (-1 / n3); 
nrtm(j,i) =  ptm(j,i)*htm(j,i) - c*etm(j,i);
% EXCLUDE NEGATIVE NP
if nrtm(j.i) < 0
nrtm(j.i) =  0;
htm(j,i) =  0;
etm(j,i) =  0;
xtm(j+l,i) =  r*zg(thetagm(j,i))*xtm(j.i)*...
(1 - xtm(j,i)/K)~ alpha + xtm(j,i); 
end
end
end
43
E n d n otes
1 Francis and Shotton (1997) discuss different types of 'risk' in fisheries manage­
ment. The uncertainty in this chapter can be categorised as model uncertainty 
in the Frincis and Shotton’s six types of uncertainty. In other words, the uncer­
tainty arises from the lack of complete information about the structure of the 
fishery (e.g., stock-recruitment relationship and effort-harvest relationship).
2 The relative costs in monitoring catch and effort depends on, for example, 
whether the fishery is a multi-species fishery and the selectivity of fishing 
gears. For instance, if the fishery is a single species fishery and exhibits strong 
selectivity for fishing gears, the cost of monitoring catch is likely to be lower 
than that of monitoring effort.
3 This research question is important because, when different policy instru­
ments are compared in an uncertain environment, expected values only provide 
a single reference point that would produce misleading results. Francis and 
Shotton (1997) discuss the problem and complexity of different performance 
measures in a stochastic environment.
4 It is important to note that prawn fisheries often have a very uncertain 
relationship between the fish stock and the level of recruitment since the re­
cruitment can be dependent on rainfall.
5 The parameter y l is estimated as 7 I =  1.37, thus the restriction, 3.7 > S > 1 
is necessary to ensure the strict concavity of the profit function. Under this 
restriction the harvest and effort functions are, respectively, strictly convex 
and concave and the revenue and cost functions are concave with respect to 
the control variables.
6As with most other fisheries, the skipjack fishery is a multi-species fishery 
and bycatch problems exist. However, this fishery is a good application to our
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model because skipjack is a relatively well-targeted species. We also note that 
in multi-species fisheries TAE control may lead to economic over (and under) 
fishing for some of the species in the absence of other forms of control.
'See Judd (1998) for further details.
8 See Appendix for Matlab code.
9The deterministic case is provided to show that a solution exists and that the 
system is stable but it is not a benchmark.
10 In this chapter we use the net profits and biomass as performance mea­
sures between TAC and TAE controls. Alternatively, it is possible to directly 
compare the catches and effort.
11 This result is consistent with the findings of Hannesson and Steinshamn 
(1991).
12 The same realizations in terms of the random variables are applied for both 
TAC and TAE controls.
18The figures of the optimal time paths with e9 =  eh =  ee =  0.05 and e9 =  
eh =  ee = 0.01 are available upon request. The key insights are the same as in 
Figure 2.1.
14Note that the simulated stock level is the biomass consistent with a dynamic 
maximum economic yield (Bmey)- The average biomass is close to the carrying 
capacity in Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 which is dues to the relative size in the 
price and cost parameter and also reflects that the fishery is, at present, not 
overexploited biologically.
15For example, Kompas and Che (2006) estimated a harvest function that 
shows the relationship between the harvest and biomass in three of the tuna
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fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific while Grafton et al. (2007) provide 
such estimates for bigeye and yellowfin tuna in the same fishery.
1(> Because the density of the biomass is close to unity with benchmark parame­
ters, sensitivity analysis that involves a higher price and lower cost (and thus a 
higher catch) provides a more useful comparison of the two policy instruments.
lt Note that the changes in the difference between the average biomass in the 
TAE and TAC controls in Figure 2.9.1 are not consistent. The reason for this 
inconsistent behaviour is not clear from the figures and a further analysis is 
needed.
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C h a p te r  3
M arine  reserves sw itching  w ith  
n o n -m arke t values u n d e r u n c e rta in ty
In trod u ction
In the last two decades, the use of marine reserves has received increased atten­
tion as a strategy to solve management failures in fisheries. There is theoretical 
and empirical evidence of various biological and socio-economic benefits from 
closing a fishing ground.1 For example, reserves can; 1) increase spawning 
biomass and population abundance; 2) improve habitat quality; 3) have a pos­
itive spillover effect from the reserve to harvested populations; 4) generate less 
variation in biomass and catch; 5) stimulate knowledge in marine biology and 
oceanography; 6) enhance tourism and recreational activities while protecting 
cultural heritage; and 7) act as insurance against catastrophe such as recruit­
ment failure and unexpected variations in marine environments (Guenette et 
al. 1998; Hilborn et al. 2004).
In contrast, it has been more controversial whether reserves can increase the 
total harvest in a fishery (Holland & Brazee 1996; Hannesson 1998 and 2002;
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Sumaila 1998). As a result of creating reserves, the overall fishing area de­
creases and thereafter the total harvest falls, especially in open access fisheries. 
Previous studies, however, have found that reserves can increase economic pay­
offs under some conditions, such as. if fish stocks are overexploited (Pezzey et 
al. 2000; Rodwell k, Roberts 2004), if the foregone benefit from closing an area 
is lower than the benefit of positive spillovers from the reserve (Sanchirico k  
Wilen 2001; Sanchirico et al. 2006) and if a large negative shock is realised in 
the biomass. Acting as a hedge against a large negative shock, reserves can 
increase the economic payoff from fisheries even if harvest and effort levels are 
optimally controlled (Grafton et al. 2006b). Costello and Polasky (2008) also 
show that it is optimal to close the fishing ground for stock recovery if the fish 
stock falls below the targeted escapement level by large stochastic variations.
The purposes of this paper are; 1) to develop a tractable bioeconomic model 
for marine reserves switching under an uncertain environment; 2) to inves­
tigate the effect of introducing a switching strategy and compare this with 
alternative policy scenarios; and 3) to analyse how the non-market value of 
reserves affects the reserve management. To accomplish these objectives, this 
paper employs a stochastic dynamic programming approach and we apply the 
developed model to the red throat emperor fishery in the Great Barrier Reef 
of Australia. In the switching strategy, a non-fishing area is rotated from one 
site to another according to economic criteria through time. While a num­
ber of previous studies have discussed whether reserves should be created and 
what their consequences would be, much less is known about whether reserves 
should be fixed at a single site or should be flexibly rotated from one site to 
another, corresponding to changes in the environment. Moreover, most previ­
ous studies examine the effect of permanent fishing closure at one site, whereas 
the switching strategy has not been clearly investigated.2
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Another important issue regarding marine reserves is the non-market value of 
reserves. Reserves often create signihcant non-use and amenity values because 
closing fishing grounds improves habitat quality and biodiversity in the envi­
ronment and this results in sustaining the ecosystem as well as natural based 
tourism in the community. The rise in the non-market value of reserves will 
consequently increase total economic returns in the fishery. Hence, it is im­
portant to take into account the non-market value of reserves in the decision 
making process. Several studies estimate the value of marine reserves by incor­
porating non-market valuation methods. Bhat (2003), for example, estimates 
that reserve-induced reef quality improvements could increase the use values 
of the reserve in Florida Keys of the U.S. by 69 per cent. By estimating a 
recreational demand curve in the Great Barrier Reef of Australia, Kragt et 
al. (2006) also show that welfare loss due to environmental degradation will 
be significant. Although there are previous bioeconomic studies on the non- 
market value of forestry (Hartman 1976; Swallow et al. 1997), as far as we 
are aware, this paper is the first study to develop a bioeconomic model of the 
non-market value of marine reserves.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, a stochastic bioeconomic 
model of marine reserves switching incorporating the non-market value of re­
serves is developed. The simulation method is also discussed. Section 3.3 
describes the red throat emperor fishery in the Great Barrier Reef of Australia 
and discusses the parameter values applied to the developed model. Section 
3.4 shows the numerical results of the model without the non-market value of 
reserves. Section 3.5 discusses how the introduction of the non-market value 
would affect the results. The last section provides concluding remarks.
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T h e  m o d e l
Biological model
Space. Spatial features are modeled by a metapopulation model, in which 
discrete patches represent a fish habitat and the size of patches is determined 
by the carrying capacity. As in other metapopulation models (for exam­
ple, Sanchirico & Wilen 1999), this paper assumes that the distance between 
patches is identical and fixed, the size of each patch is constant and the transfer 
function Ty(x) captures the various forms of fish dispersal processes between 
patches. Here, x = (x1 x 2 • • • xn) denotes the vector of fish stocks and i, j  £ Af  
is the site index, M  = {1,2, . . . ,  n}.
Population dynamics. Time is discrete, indexed by t £ N. The population 
dynamics in site i £ J\f at time t are modelled as:
where x\ is the fish stock and K l is the carrying capacity in site i. The first 
term is the escapement in each period. If site i is a fishing ground, the fish 
stock is exploited by the harvest level h\ > Ü, whereas h\ =  0 if a reserve is 
placed on the site. The second term represents the density dependent growth 
function with the intrinsic growth rate r. The third term is the fish transfer 
function. The term z f  represents stochastic variations in fish growth at site 
i (growth uncertainty) and z f  is a large negative shock that is proportional 
to the fish stock. Assume that negative shocks are only realized in fishing
3
3
(3T)
50
grounds due to fishing activities. This assumption reflects empirical evidence 
that there is a higher risk of habitat destruction and stock-recruitment failure 
in a fishing ground than in a reserve (Goni 1998; Turner et al. 1999; Jennings 
et al. 2001).
Uncertainties. The growth uncertainty is specified as z9 =  1 + (2u — l)e, 
where u is a uniformly discretised grid. The term e determines the size of 
variations and lies between 0 and 1, indicating from 0 per cent to 100 per 
cent variation. It is assumed that z9 follows a Markov process with the same 
transition probabilities between each state. The large negative shock is 
specified as:
0 if ujt =  1 (shock is not realised) 
[a  if ujt =  2 (shock is realised)
(3.2)
If the indicator variable uot is 2 at time t, then the negative shock is realised, 
otherwise there is no shock. The size of the negative shock is proportional to 
the stock level that is determined by parameter a.
Transfer function. The transfer function captures the characteristics of fish 
flow from one site to another. It is important to consider fish dispersal, since 
the spatial features and the policy implications of marine reserves significantly 
depend on the linkages between sites (Sanchirico & Wilen 2001; Sanchirico et 
al. 2006). In the closed process, there are no interactions between sites and 
the biomass in each site is determined only by the own growth and harvest 
rate. In the fully integrated open process, on the other hand, each site is 
interconnected and allows temporary local extinction of the fish stock as well 
as stock recoveries through fish transfer from another site. In the closed system, 
however, stock recovery does not happen once the fish stock falls to zero.
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Assume that the fish flow depends on the relative density of the biomass 
between the sites. Following previous studies (for example, Conrad 1999; 
Sanchirico & Wilen 2001; Grafton et al. 2006b), the transfer function is spec­
ified as:
Tij (x) =  m K 1 ^yr- — —  ^  ^  2 and 2 are adjecent, (3-3)
wdiere m is the transfer coefficient. Assuming that the size of each site is 
identical, the transfer function can be reduced to m  (ad — x l). In this case, the 
transfer coefficient, m, represents the migration rate, which is the fraction of 
the difference in biomass between sites i and j.
Economic model
Suppose that T C J\f is a set of the sites that are open for fishing, then, the 
net profit at time t is defined as:
ntip = p(ht)ht -  ^  c(x\)h\, (3.4)
*€ r
where h — J T r h \  p(-) is the inverse demand function and c(-) is the cost 
function. The inverse demand and cost functions are defined as, respectively:
p(-) = ph^1^ 6 and c(-) =  c/x\ (3.5)
where 5 is the constant price elasticity of demand and p and c are parameters. 
Note that this demand function form can capture the various forms of demand. 
If 0 < ö < oo, for example, Ph < 0, hence the demand curve is downward 
sloping, whereas the price is constant if (5 —> oo. For the cost function cx < 0 
and cxx > 0. Thus, the total fishing cost decreases in the biomass and the 
decreasing rate is progressive.
The location of reserve is the regulator’s control variable, which is optimally
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chosen. The harvest level is sub-optimally controlled by setting a rule-of- 
thumb total allowable catch (TAC). Also, in the presence of various forms 
of uncertainty, a constant escapement policy is not likely to be the optimal 
harvesting strategy, but the policy function is a function of the biomass (Sethi 
et al. 2005). Thus, we employ a feedback control policy where the harvest in 
each patch is a fraction of the biomass. In other words h\ = 9x\ if i G T, but 
h\ — 0 if i 0 r .3 Varying the value of 6, the effect of different levels of harvest 
pressure can be analysed.
N on-m ark et value o f reserves
We suppose that the non-market value of marine reserves is a function of 
a weighted average of the population density and length of closing a fishing 
ground. In other words, <f> = a 3 • (x/K)  + (1 — <a3) • r where c*3 G [0,1] is a 
weighting parameter and r G { 0 ,1 ,2 , . . . }  is the length of closing a site. To 
make the two terms, x / K  and r, consistent, r is redefined on the [0.1] interval 
and thus d> G [0,1]. We assume that o 3 =  0.5. The non-market value function 
is then defined as:
7T/mkt(<S>t ) &0
\  e [ai-cc2<b(xt ,Tt)\ ’ O q i  O U ,  >  0 (3.6)
This is a logistic function where dnnmk/d$> > 0 . The parameter o0 represents 
the maximum value of nnmkt, and on and c*2 , respectively, determine the cur­
vature of the function and the speed of reaching the maximum value. With 
this function form, the non-market value of reserves initially increases in a pro­
gressive way as <f> rises, while the rate of increase diminishes when the value 
becomes closer to the maximum value. In other words, when d> is small the 
function is strictly convex and the function becomes strictly concave after 
reaches a certain value. After the non-market value reaches to the maximum
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value, the value remains at the maximum value as T increases.
D y n am ic  o p tim isa tio n  m o d e l
The objective function for the regulator’s optimization problem is the sum 
of the discounted net profit from exploiting the fish stock and the non-market 
value of creating reserves over time ( Y t A  = Y t  {nt P + 7T^mkt)). The regulator 
aims to maximise the discounted total return over an infinite time horizon. The 
future return is discounted with the discounting factor ß G (0,1). This paper 
considers a case with two sites and supposes that site 1 is initially closed. The 
maximisation problem is then defined as:
oo
maxEo
t =o
subject to <
A+i  =  A  +  zf r x \  ( l  ~  j k ) + m  (x2t -  x\)
A+i  =  A  ~ ht +  z f r x 2t ( l  -  -  z f x 2 - m ( x 2 -  x])
x1q = xl(0), Zq = 25Z(0 ), and Zq = zSJ(0), i = 1,2
(3.7)
The Bellman equation is:
V(xt,z?,z®) -  max|7T*(^2) + ßE0V (x t+1, zf+1, zj+1),
7r*(xj) -  /%(7r*(x2)) + ßEoV(xt+i, zf+1, z^ +1) |
(3.8)
where E0 is the mathematical expectation operator and x. zs and zs are the 
vectors of the fish stock, stochastic variations in fish growth and negative 
shock, respectively. The term k(-) is the transaction cost function of rotating 
the reserve. We assume that the transaction cost is a function of the foregone 
profit by closing the area and dhz/dir*l > 0. This reflects that the opportunity
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cost of closing a fishing ground increases as the forgone profit of fishing in 
the area increases. We also assume that the cost is proportional to the profit, 
thereby, «(7r**) =  ko7t*\ where € [0,1]. The greater the parameter k0 the 
higher is the transaction cost.
The value function V(-) (the left hand side of equation (3.8)) represents the 
maximum attainable objective function at time t. The first term on the right 
hand side of the equation, 7T*(-), is the total return if site 1 is continuously 
closed. The next term /?E0V(*) represents the discounted expected value func­
tion at time t + 1. The first expression, 7r*(-) + /3E0VA(-), is thus the overall total 
return when site 1 is closed. The second expression 7r*(-) — «(•) + ßEoV(’)t 
represents the overall total return when the reserve is rotated.
Simulation method
Due to the complexity of the model, the analytical solution of the optimiza­
tion problem would not exist. Thus, the problem is numerically solved by ap­
proximating the value function with the collocation method.4 In other words,
V (x. zg, zs) «  Ylt=i ki&h where (p is a degree L polynomial basis function with 
coefficients k and,
l  m  Q
V (x, zg, zs) «  max {tt(x2) + ß ^  ^  ^  w9mwsqki(pi{x, z9m, zsq),
1=1 m = l  q—l
L M Q
Trfx1) -  n(n(x2t )) + E w3mwsqk,<]>,(x, z ? ,z j) |
l m q
(3.9)
where w9m and wq are the probabilities of the realisation of each state in the 
growth uncertainty and negative shock, respectively. Growth uncertainty z9 
is discretised with 10 grids (M =  10) and the negative shock 2 s is discretised 
with two grids (Q = 2). This paper uses the Chebyshev polynomials as the
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basis function.
R ed  th roat em peror fishery in A u stra lia
The model developed in the previous section is applied to the red throat em­
peror fishery in the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) of Queensland, Australia. The 
red throat emperor (Lethrinus miniatus) is a secondly target species for both 
the commercial and recreational sectors in the Coral Reef Fin Fish Fishery 
(CRFFF) of the GBR. The major fishing method is hook and line gear for all 
sectors and spear for the recreational sector. The fishery is currently overseen 
by the Queensland Department of Primary Industries & Fisheries (DPI&F) 
and regulated under Queensland's Fisheries (Coral Reef Fin Fish Fishery) 
Management Plan 2003. The fishery is managed by setting the total allowable 
catch (TAC) with individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for the commercial 
catch and by regulating the minimum legal size (Leigh et al. 2006). Moreover, 
since the fishery operates within the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area 
(GBRWHA), the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) also 
imposes management measures on the fishery including temporary and per­
manently closing a fishing ground (Williams 2003).
Figure 3.1 shows the changes in catch and catch per unit of effort (CPUE) 
of the fishery over time. Before the introudction of ITQs in 2004 the annual 
catch increased approximately four times between 1980 and 2003, creating 
concern about the long-term sustainability of the fishery (Leigh et al. 2006). 
In contrast, the catch per unit of effort dropped dramatically in the mid 1990s. 
This decline could be due to a recruitment failure in the fish stock during the 
period.5 The price of red throat emperor is relatively stable. For example the 
gross value of production, the fish price received by the fisher at landing, is
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Figure 3.1 Catch and C P U E  over tim e
CPUE
Catch
constant at around AS5.000 per tonne (CHRIS 2008) and the market price of 
whole red throat emperor stays at around A$4 (Little et al. 2009).
To simulate the developed model in Matlab,6 the values for the biological 
parameters are obtained from Leigh et al. (2006). The intrinsic growth rate 
(r) is 0.12 and the carrying capacity (K ) is 6,913 tonnes. Since the price of 
red throat emperor at landing is relatively stable at around A$5,000 per tonne, 
we assume that the elasticity of demand is infinite and the price parameter is 
5. In the absence of adequate data, the parameters in the cost function and 
transfer coefficient are initially set at c = 2 and m = 0.1 and the sensitivity 
analysis of changes in these parameters is undertaken. The harvest fraction is 
initially arbitrary set at 6 = 0.08 and the effect of changes in the parameter is 
also tested.7 The parameter in growth uncertainty is e = 0.05 and the arrival 
rate of the negative shock is 0.04 and the size of the shock is a = 0.13. The 
time discounting rate is 10 per cent.
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N u m erica l resu lts  w ith o u t non-m arket value o f  reserves
In this section, we analyse the marine reserves switching without the non- 
market value of marine reserves, by comparing the switching strategy with 
alternative policy scenarios. Before introducing the non-market value of re­
serves, it is important to examine what policy results the switching strategy 
would induce, how they differ from other policy scenarios and how the opti­
mal switching rule varies depending on changes in the biological and economic 
parameters.
Comparisons in harvest and biomass under different policy scenarios
Open process. The density distribution of the biomass and harvest is, re­
spectively, presented in Figure 3.2 for three policy scenarios: marine reserves 
switching, fixed reserve and no-reserve cases. In the fixed reserve case, the non­
fishing area is permanently fixed at a single site, whereas, in the no-reserve 
case, the reserve is not created at all times. Figure 3.2 shows that the man­
agement with reserves produces a signihcantly higher biomass. Figure 3.2 also 
shows two important functions the reserve possesses. First, the reserve works 
as a buffer against stochastic variations and second, fish dispersal from the 
reserve to harvested populations smooth the average biomass over sites. As 
a result, the management with reserves generates a smaller variance in both 
the biomass and harvest. Moreover, due to these two effects, the total harvest 
in the management with reserves could become greater than that in the no­
reserve case. This result is consistent with previous studies, such as Lauck et 
al. (1998); Grafton et al. (2006b); Costello and Polasky (2008). Acting as a 
hedge against large stochastic variations, reserves increase the total harvest.
Where the switching and fixed reserve strategies are compared, although the 
difference is not large in this case, the biomass is likely to become higher in
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Figure 3.2 Density distributions of biomass and harvest (m = 0.1, 6 =  0.08)
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the fixed reserve case. The harvest is, on the other hand, more likely to be 
greater in the switching strategy. In the switching strategy fishing grounds 
are rotated to a more profitable area. Consequently, the switching strategy 
generates a greater catch than the fixed reserve case, but results in a smaller 
biomass. It is important to note that, in Figure 3.2, the difference between 
the switching and fixed reserve case is not significant, but the difference could 
be large depending on the biological and economic parameters. This will be 
discussed next.
Closed process. The density distribution of the biomass and harvest under 
the closed dispersal process for the three policy scenarios are compared in 
Figure 3.3, respectively. The density distribution of the biomass is similar 
to that under the open process. Since one of the fishing grouds is closed, the 
management with reserves generates a higher biomass than the no-reserve case. 
Also, the biomass in the fixed reserve case is likely to be greater than that in 
the switching strategy. This is because the fishing area is rotated to a more 
profitable area in the switching strategy and, as a result, the total fish stocks 
are more exploited. In the closed process the reserve still works as a buffer 
against stochastic variations and this makes the variations in the biomass and 
harvest in the management with reserves smaller than those in the no-reserve
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Figure 3.3 Density distributions of biomass and harvest under the closed process
(m = 0, 9 —  0.08)
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case.
In contrast, when there are no linkages between sites, there is no fish dispersal 
from the reserve to harvested populations, thus the reserve does not smooth 
the average biomass over sites. The harvest in the fixed reserve case is much 
lower than that in the other two cases. Without a reasonable volume of fish 
flow, the total harvestable population becomes significantly small in the fixed 
reserve case. In other words, when there are only relatively wreak linkages 
between sites, large trade-offs exist between the harvest and biomass in the 
fixed reserve case. In contrast, switching the reserve can decrease the degree 
of trade-off between the harvest and biomass. By rotating a non-fishing area 
over time, the switching strategy maintains a relatively high catch level as well 
as fish stocks, even if there are only weak linkages between adjacent sites.
Sensitivity analysis
The difference in the biomass and harvest between various policy scenarios 
depends on the relative size of the biological and economic parameters. As 
shown in the previous subsection, the biomass is always the highest in the fixed 
reserve case and the smallest in the no-reserve case. Moreover, the simulations
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with various parameter values of the biological and economic variables show 
that this relationship in the biomass always holds. In this section, we focus 
on the sensitivity analysis of the harvest by testing how the different values 
of transfer coefficient (m), harvest fraction (6), harvesting cost (c) and size of 
negative shock (a) affect the results. Monte Carlo simulations generate 10,000 
sets of 100-period time series of the harvest and we subsequently compute the 
difference in the average harvest over 100 periods between each policy scenario.
Transfer coefficient (m). The fish transfer coefficient is important in de­
termining the benefit of marine reserves. Fish dispersal from the reserve to 
harvested populations depend on the transfer coefficient, m. The smaller the 
transfer coefficient, for example, the less the volume of fish that transfers from 
the reserve to harvested populations. As a result, the speed of stock recoveries 
as well as strength of smoothing the stock level over sites becomes low. Dif­
ferent values of the transfer coefficient are applied to test the effect of changes 
in the parameter.
Panel (a) in Figure 3.4 presents the average harvest difference between the 
switching and fixed reserve cases. The harvest difference is always positive for 
all domains and the difference becomes larger as the linkages decreases. This 
result is consistent with what we saw in the density distribution of the harvest 
under the closed process (Figure 3.3). When there are only weak linkages 
between sites, the harvestable population in the fixed reserve case becomes 
much smaller than the switching strategy. In other words, as m  increases, the 
sub-populations at sites 1 and 2 effectively become a single population so that 
rotating a reserve is not beneficial. In addition it is important to note that, 
in the switching strategy, the harvest remains at a high level through rotating 
the fishing area over time. However, the greater harvest produces a relatively 
smaller biomass than in the fixed reserve case.
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Panel (b) in Figure 3.4 illustrates the difference in the average harvest between 
the switching and no-reserve cases. There is a clear negative relationship be­
tween the rate of fish transfer and harvest difference. Recall that the transfer 
coefficient, m, represents the proportion of the difference in biomass that mi­
grates from a more dense to a less dense area. Panel (b) shows that if the 
migration rate is less than around 9 per cent, the no-reserve case is likely to 
produce a greater harvest than the switching strategy. In this case, there is 
no sufficient level of fish dispersal from the reserve to fishing ground. As a 
result, although the short-run harvest could be greater in the switching strat­
egy following a large negative shock, the overall harvest becomes smaller than 
that in the fixed reserve case. On the other hand, once the migration rate 
becomes greater than about 9 per cent, the average harvest difference becomes 
greater. In this case, even if the harvest difference between the switching and 
no-reserve cases is negative at the steady-state, the short-run increase in the 
harvest of the switching strategy, following a large negative shock, can over­
whelm the negative harvest difference at the steady-state. Consequently, the 
total harvest in the switching strategy becomes greater than in the no-reserve 
case. This is because the spillover from the reserve to harvested populations 
quickly smooths the average biomass over sites.
Panel (c) in Figure 3.4 shows the average harvest difference between the switch­
ing and fixed reserve case. The relationship between the transfer coefficient 
and harvest difference is similar to that in Panel (b). However, when the mi­
gration rate is relatively low, the difference in the average harvest is much 
lower than before. Without a sufficient level of fish migration from the reserve 
to harvested areas, fixing a non-fishing area at one site significantly decreases 
the total harvestable population, whereas the switching strategy avoids this 
by rotating the reserve over time.
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Figure 3.4 Sensitiv ity  analysis o f the harvest difference (transfer coefficient)
(a) Harvest difference between switching and fixed reserve (b) Harvest difference between switching and no-reserve
(c) Harvest difference between fixed reserve and no-reserve
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Harvest fraction (0). The harvest fraction is another key variable to de­
termine the difference between the three policy scenarios. If fish stocks are 
heavily exploited, the marginal benefit of hsh migration from reserve to har­
vested areas increases. This is because the greater the harvest fraction, the 
larger the closed area is necessary to compensate for the greater reduction in 
biomass. Panel (b) in Figure 3.5 shows that the harvest difference monotoni- 
cally increases as the harvest fraction increases. In contrast, when fish stocks 
are moderately exploited compared to the benchmark case, the average harvest 
in the no-reserve case can be greater than in the switching case. In this case, 
the marginal benefit of closing a fishing area is less than the foregone profit 
that could be obtained if the reserve were not created. A similar relationship 
in the average harvest difference between the fixed reserve and no-reserve cases 
is shown in Panel (c).
Where the average harvest difference between the switching and fixed reserve 
cases is compared in Panel (a) of Figure 3.5, there is a negative relationship 
between the size of the harvest fraction and the harvest difference. In the 
switching strategy, the fishing grounds are rotated to more profitable areas 
over time, producing a greater harvest, especially when the harvest fraction 
is large. However, switching the reserve also produces a relatively smaller 
biomass. Therefore, there are trade-offs between the harvest and biomass in 
switching a reserve. Also notice that the harvest difference diminishes as the 
transaction cost of switching increases. The optimal frequency of rotating a 
reserve approaches zero as the transaction cost rises. Once the transaction 
cost of switching reaches a certain level, the switching and fixed-reserve cases 
are identical.
Harvesting cost (c). The optimal switching rule depends on the profitability 
of exploiting fish stocks and thus the price-cost ratio is an important factor in
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Figure 3.5 Sensitiv ity  analysis o f the harvest difference (harvest fraction)
(a) Harvest difference between switching and fixed reserve (b) Harvest difference between switching and no-reserve
(c) Harvest difference between fixed reserve and no-reserve
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Figure 3.6 Sensitivity analysis of the harvest difference (harvesting cost)
(a) Harvest difference between switching and fixed reserve (b) Harvest difference between switching and no-reserve
effective fisheries management. Figure 3.6 illustrates how the harvest difference 
between the different policy scenarios changes in the harvesting cost. As the 
harvesting cost increases, for example, the net profit becomes more sensitive in 
a decline in the fish stock. As a result, the greater the harvesting cost the higher 
the frequency of rotating the fishing ground to a new site where fish stocks 
are relatively more abundant. This implies that, as the cost increases, the 
switching case has a greater harvest than the other two cases. It is important to 
note that there is an important linkage between this result and the optimal size 
of a reserve. Grafton et al. (2006b) find that the optimal reserve size increases 
in the harvesting cost. This is because a larger size of reserves is optimal with 
a greater cost of exploiting fish stocks, while generating a sufficient level of 
spillovers to fishing grounds.
Size of negative shocks (a). An important function reserves possess is 
working as a buffer against a large negative shock in fish populations. Follow­
ing a shock, fish dispersal from the reserve to harvested areas cause declined 
fish stocks recover to the steady-state level more quickly. This resilience effect 
is further enhanced in the size of shock and its arrival rate. Therefore, the cost 
of creating reserves also decreases as the size of shock and the arrival rate in-
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Figure 3.7 Sensitivity analysis of the harvest difference (size of negative shock)
(a) Harvest difference between switching and fixed reserve (b) Harvest difference between switching and no-reserve
(c) Harvest difference between fixed reserve and no-reserve
creases. These results are illustrated in Figure 3.7. Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 
3.7 show that, when the size of shock is relatively small, the harvest difference 
between the management with and without reserves becomes negative. Panel 
(a) of Figure 3.8 also shows that, with a relatively small size of negative shocks 
( a  =  0.05), the mean value of the harvest in the management with reserves 
is smaller. In this case, although the reserve generates the spillovers to the 
harvested population, the benefit from the resilience effect is less than the cost 
of closing a hshing ground. On the other hand, reserves significantly increases 
the total harvest in the presence of relatively larger size of negative shocks 
(Panel (a) of Figure 3.7 and Panel (b) of Figure 3.8).
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Figure 3.8 Sensitivity analysis: density distribution of harvest
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Switching and negative shock
The previous subsection shows that the economic benefit from switching a re­
serve is greater in the presence of large negative shocks. In other words, the 
switching and fixed reserve cases are identical when the size of shock is rela­
tively small (see Panel (a) of Figures 3.7 and 8). As the size of shock increases, 
the harvest difference between the switching and fixed reserve cases becomes 
greater. Population density at the current fishing ground falls following a 
shock and then the area is closed for stock recovery in the switching strategy. 
In the meantime, the fishing ground is rotated to a more stock abundant area 
and, as a result, the harvest level increases following a large negative shock. 
We analyse this effect more carefully in Figure 3.9, which illustrates how the 
harvest difference between the switching and fixed reserve cases behaves over 
time following a large negative shock.8 To test the sensitivity of the result, 
different sizes of negative shock are applied. In this simulation, a shock arrives 
at time one and the reserve is correspondingly rotated to a new area in the 
switching strategy, whereas the non-fishing area remains at the same place in 
the fixed reserve case.
In the switching strategy, a fishing area is rotated to the previously closed area
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Figure 3.9 Response to different sizes of a negative shock: 
harvest difference between switching and fixed reserve
a  = 0.13
--------a  = 0.3
a  = 0.6
where fish stocks are relatively more abundant, following the shock. As a result, 
the harvest difference between the switching and fixed reserve cases becomes 
much larger in the short run. At the same time, however, the greater harvest 
in the switching strategy results in a smaller biomass than the fixed reserve 
case. Therefore, the harvest difference also becomes negative for a certain 
period after the short-run jump. Particularly if the size of a shock is larger, 
then the short-run increase in the harvest of the switching strategy is greater; 
however the period will be longer for the harvest difference being negative 
after the short-run jump. The harvest difference eventually approaches zero as 
fish stocks recover to the steady-state level in the switching strategy. Overall, 
Figure 3.9 shows that there is a trade-off between the long-run and short-run 
harvest in rotating a reserve.
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Figure 3.10 Different types of the non-market value function
Type 2
Type 3
Type 1
N on -m ark et value o f reserves
In this section we examine how the optimal switching rule changes once the 
non-market value of marine reserves is introduced. The regulator’s objective 
is to maximise total returns (the sum of the discounted net profit and non­
market value), instead of only the net profit of the fishery. To investigate how 
the optimal switching rule and its consequence differ depending on various 
characteristics of the non-market value of reserves, this paper considers three 
different types of the non-market value function illustrated in Figure 3.10. 
In Type 1, the non-market value of reserves reaches the maximum value in 
a relatively short time. In Type 2, the non-market value also rises to the 
maximum value relatively quickly, but the maximum value is greater than in 
Type 1. In Type 3, the maximum value is the same as Type 2, while it requires 
a higher biomass as well as longer closing period of a fishing area to realise the 
maximum value.
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T otal returns, sw itch ing and negative shock
Figure 3.11 shows how the difference in total returns between the switching 
and fixed reserve cases behaves over time following a large negative shock. 
A shock arrives at time one and the reserve is correspondingly rotated to a 
new site in the switching strategy, but the reserve remains at the same site as 
before in the fixed reserve case. As shown in Figure 3.9. switching the reserve 
increases the harvest in the short-run following the shock. This is because 
the fishing ground is rotated to the area where fish stocks are more abundant. 
The harvest in the switching strategy becomes greater than that in the fixed 
reserve case in the short-run. but the harvest difference also becomes negative 
for a certain period after the short-run jump due to the trade-off between the 
harvest and biomass in switching a reserve.
When the non-market value of reserves is included, however, switching the 
reserve also decreases the non-market value. This is because the non-fishing 
area is rotated to a new site and this produces a smaller biomass. If the non- 
market value of reserves rises to the maximum value in a relatively short time, 
such as in Types 1 and 2 in Figure 3.10. then the decrease in the non-market 
value quickly recovers to the maximum value. As a result, the time paths of 
the difference in total returns for Types 1 and 2 are almost the same in Figure 
3.11. In contrast, if it requires a longer closing period and higher biomass to 
realise the maximum non-market value of reserves (Type 3 in Figure 3.10), the 
short-run jump becomes smaller than in the previous case. In addition, there is 
a much longer period that the difference in total returns between the switching 
and fixed reserve cases is negative after the short-run jump. Therefore, in this 
case, the overall benefit from switching is less than when the maximum non- 
market value of reserves is realised in a short time. In the next subsection, we 
analyse how the optimal frequency of switching relates this.
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Figure 3.11 Response to a negative shock:
harvest difference between switching and fixed reserve
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Optim al frequency of switching
Table 3.1 shows the optimal frequency of switching in four different cases. 
Monte Carlo simulations generate 10,000 sets of time series of the control 
variable and the optimal frequency of switching is computed for each set of 
time series. When there is no non-market value of reserves, the non-fishing 
area is rotated for, on average, 3.53 per cent of the total period. The optimal 
frequency of switching is less, once the non-market value of reserves is included. 
This is because switching the reserve not only increases the harvest, but also 
decreases the total return in the presence of non-market values. The optimal 
frequency of switching also differs depending on the type of non-market value 
function. The optimal frequency is the highest with Type 1 and the lowest 
with Type 3. In Type 1, the maximum value is relatively low and is realised 
with a smaller biomass and shorter closing period. Thus, the forgone non- 
market benefit from rotating a reserve is less than the other two types. On 
the other hand, in Type 3, the maximum value is relatively high and a higher
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Table 3.1 Optimal frequency of switching (m = 0.1, 6  =  0.08)
Without non-market value With non-market value
Type 1 Tvpe2 Type3
Mean 0.0353 0.0198 0.0156 0.0139
Standard Deviation 0.0157 0.0111 0.0076 0.0063
Max 0.15 0.1 0.08 0.07
Min 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table 3.2 Optimal frequency of switching (m = 0.1, 6 = 0.1)
Without non-market value With non-market value
Type 1 Tvpe2 Type3
Mean 0.363 0.275 0.182 0.108
Standard Deviation 0.0098 0.0127 0.0392 0.0063
Max 0.395 0.3 0.24 0.21
Min 0.32 0.11 0.04 0.01
biomass as well as longer closing period is required to realise the maximum 
value. Therefore, the foregone benefit from switching the reserve is greater 
than with the other two types. As a result, the optimal frequency of switching 
is less than the others.
In Table 3.1, the optimal frequency of switching is less, compared to the total 
time period. However, the frequency depends on the biological and economic 
parameters. As shown in the sensitivity analysis (Figures 3.4 to 3.9), the ben­
efit of switching a reserve depends on these parameters. For example, Table 
3.2 shows that when the harvest fraction is larger, the optimal frequency of 
switching increases for every case. We, however, emphasise that the relation­
ship between each case still holds.
C oncluding rem arks
The use of marine reserves has received increased attention as a policy in­
strument to solve management failures in various fisheries. Previous studies 
have found that, under some conditions, reserves will provide a win-win solu-
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tion. in which both biomass and harvest are greater than management without 
reserves. While these studies provide important insights into the design of op­
timal reserve management, much less is known about whether non-fishing areas 
should be rotated over time or whether they should be permanently fixed at 
an originally placed location.
Using a dynamic programming approach under uncertainty, this paper analyses 
a marine reserves switching strategy, with the non-market value of reserves in 
a stochastic environment. Applying the developed model to the red throat 
emperor fishery in the Great Barrier Reef, the study shows that the switching 
strategy can maintain a relatively high catch and biomass, even if there are 
weak linkages between sites. In contrast, if sufficient spillovers from the reserve 
to the harvested population were not generated, fixing the non-fishing area at 
one site could substantially decrease the total harvest. Therefore, when the 
migration rate is relatively low, there is a strong trade-off between the harvest 
and biomass in the fixed reserve case, whereas switching a reserve will decrease 
this trade-off. The paper also shows that, although the switching strategy 
produces a higher biomass than the no-reserve case, it has a relatively smaller 
biomass than when the reserve is permanently fixed at one site.
With respect to the non-market value of marine reserves, the results show 
that the optimal frequency of switching decreases once the non-market value 
is included in the decision process. Switching the reserve is, however, still 
optimal, if the non-market value is relatively low and if the value is realised with 
a relatively smaller biomass and shorter closing time. If the economic payoff 
from non-fishing activities is significantly large and/or if it is difficult to realise 
the non-market value (for example, higher biomass and longer closing period 
are required), switching the non-fishing area is then less likely to generate extra 
benefits. The paper also shows that the optimal timing of switching depends
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on the size and arrival rate of large stochastic variations.
Overall, this study concludes that it is optimal to rotate a non-fishing area ac­
cordingly from one site to another, especially in the presence of large stochastic 
variations. The switching strategy could maintain high catch level as well as 
fish stocks. But, the fisheries environment and the condition of the ecosystem 
have to be carefully monitored to determine the timing of switching. A mis­
placed switching could increase the risk of environmental degradation as well 
as decrease the amenity value of reserves.
There are several potential extensions of this study. For instance, while in 
this chapter we employ a numerical technique to analyse the non-market value 
and optimal marine reserve switching strategies, it is worthwhile to develop a 
bioeconomic model that can be analytically solved. Such a model will help us to 
further understand the relationship between the non-market value and marine 
reserve switching. Another potential extension is to extend the current model 
to include an explicit spatial structure of marine reserves. The bioeconomic 
model constructed in this chapter only considers two sub-populations where the 
reserve and exploited populations are connected through the density dependent 
transfer function. By contrast, a spatially explicit bioeconomic model permits 
us to analyse how the optimal network structure of ‘no-take’ areas changes in 
different economic and biological conditions.
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A p p en d ix
M atlab  code for m arine reserve sw itch ing
%%%% switching.m
%%%%
%%%% This program solves a dynamic bioeconomic model 
%%%% by collocation method
%%%% Policy instrument: marine reserve switching
%%%%
clear all 
close all 
clc
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 1. SET MODEL PARAMETERES
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
delta = 0.9: % discount rate 
p =  5; % price para 
cl = 2; % cost para 
c2 =  cl; % cost para 
r l =  .12; % int growth rate 
r2 =  .12; % int growth rate 
K1 =  6913/2; % carrying capacity 
K2 =  6913/2; % carrying capacity 
K -  K1+K2;
ep =  inf: % price elasticity of demand 
kapO = 0.; % transaction cost 
gam = 0.08; % harvest fraction 
phi =  0.1; % fish movement para
% NON-MARKET VALUE FUNCTION
betaO =100;
betal = 5;
beta2 =  35;
beta3 =  .5;
% INITIAL CONDITIONS 
xlO =  .5; 
x20 =  .5;
76
initarea =  1; % area initiall closed
xlmin = 0; % min biomass in 1 
xlmax = Kl; % max biomass in 1 
x2min =  0; % min biomass in 2 
x2max =  K2 ; % max biomass in 2
% OTHER REQUIRED PARAMETERS 
time =  200;
M =  10000;
tol =  le-10: % tolerance
maxit = 10; % maximum number of iteration 
n =  100: % collocation nodes 
pol = 5; % degree of polynomial
% UNCERTAINTIES 
uv =  10; % size of shock vector 
us =  0.05; % size of uncertainty 
un =  linspace(0,l,uv); % discretise 
zu =  1 +  (2*mr - l)*us;
d =  ones(uv,l); 
pi =  1/uv; 
pim = d*pi; 
pirn =  pim*d'; 
load indz_monte
% LARGE NEGATIVE SHOCK 
% (TWO STATES l:NO SHOCK ANA 2:SHOCK) 
ssize =  0.13; % size of shock (percentage of fish stock) 
pnsh =  0.04; % probability negative shock occur 
nsh(l) = 1; % initially no shock
shtr =  [1-pnsh pnsh; 10] ;% transition matrix for shock 
load nsh_monte
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 2. COLLOCATION NODES and BASIS FUNCTION
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[zl,xl] =  chebn(n,xlmin.xlmax); % nodes 
[z2,x2] =  chebn(n,x2min,x2max); % nodes
dl — ones((n*n*2+n),l); 
xl =  d l* x l’;
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xl = xl(:); 
x2 = x2*dl’; 
x2 = x2(:);
x = xl+x2; 
save(’x r ,,x l ’); 
save(’x2Vx2’); 
save(’x_aiixYx’) 
clear xl x2 dl
x = chebba2(x); % basis fn
save(’xVx’);
clear x
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 3. COMPUTE NET PROFITS AT TIME 0
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load xl 
load x2
nr =  zeros((n*n*2+n)*n,2); % define 
111 = gam*xl; 
h2 -= gam*x2:
nr(:,l) =  max(p*h2A(1-1/ep) - c2*gam*K2,0); % when xl is clsoe 
nr(:,2) — max(p*hl A (1-1/ep) - cl*gam*K1.0); % when x2 is clsoe 
save(’nrYnr’); 
clear nr xl x2
% TRANSACTION COST
kapl =  kapO*(max(p*hl A (1-1/ep) - cl*gam*Kl,0)); 
kap2 =  kapO*(max(p*h2A(1-1/ep) - c2*gam*K2,0)); 
save(’kapYkaplYkap2’); 
clear hi h2 kapl kap2
% NON-MARKET VALUE 
load x_aux 
dl =  ones(n,l);
t_aux =  linspace(0,n*2,n*2-(-l); 
t_aux =  dl*t_aux; 
t_aux =  t_aux(:); 
t = t_aux;
i — 0;
while i < n-1 
t =  [t;t_aux];
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i =  i+1; 
end
clear t_aux d l 
H =  zeros((n*n*2+n)*n,2);
H(:,l) =  alpha0*(alpha2*(x/K).*(l-x/K)+(l-alpha2)*(t/200).*(l-
t/200)).' alphal:
H(:,2) = alphaO*(alpha2*(x/K).*(l-x/K))Ualphal; 
save('HVH);
clear bl b2 H Hl H2 x xl xl t d dl
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 4. COMPUTE STATE TRANSITIONS
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load xl 
load x2
% WHEN X2 IS CLOSED
gll=zeros((n*n*2+n)*n.l);
g21=zeros((n*n*2-fn)*n,l);
for i = l:uv % take the expected value over uncertantv 
g ll  =  g ll  + pi*(min(xl + zu(i)*rl*xl.*(l-xl/K l) +... 
phi*Kl*(x2/K2 - xl/K l),xlm ax)); 
g21 =  g21 +  pi*(min(x2 +  zu(i)*r2*x2.*(l-x2/K2) 
phi*Kl*(x2/K2 - xl/Kl)-gam*x2,x2max));
g21 =  max((l-pnsh)*g21 + pnsh*(g21 - ssize*x2),0); % take the expected
value over negative shock
end
M il =  gll+g21;
save(’M liy M ll’)
clear M il g ll g21
% WHEN X2 IS CLOSED
gl2=zeros((n*n*2+n)*n.l);
g22=zeros((n*n*2+n)*n,l);
for i — l:uv % take the expected value over uncertanty 
gl2 =  gl2 + pi*(min(xl + zu(i)*rl*xl.*(l-xl/K l) +... 
phi*Kl*(x2/K2 - xl/Kl)-gam*xl,xlmax)); 
g22 =  g22 + pi*(min(x2 +  zu(i)*r2*x2.*(l-x2/K2) 
phi*Kl*(x2/K2 - xl/Kl),x2max));
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gl2 — max((l-pnsh)*gl2 + pnsh*(gl2 - ssize*xl),0); % take the expected
value over negative shock
end
M2 2 =  gl2+g22; 
save(,M227M22’) 
clear M22 gl2 g22
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 5. GUESS INITIAL PARAMETERS (OLS)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load nr load kap load H 
% XI IS CLOSED
nr_cl =  [nr(:,l)+H(:,l) nr(:,2)-kap2+H(:,2)]; 
nr_cl =  nr_cl';
[VI,Gl] =  max(nr_cl);
[gl g2] =  gfuncsfi(Gl'); 
g =  gl+g2; 
clear gl g2 
g =  chebba2(g);
a_cl =  g \V l’; %iniital guess for parameters 
clear nr_cl g VI Gl
% X2 IS CLOSED
nr_c2 =  [nr(:,l)-kapl+H(:,2) nr(:,2)+H(:,l)]; 
nr_c2 =  nr_c2’;
[V2,G2] =  max(nr_c2);
[gl g2] =  gfuncsfi(G2’);
g =  gl+g2; 
clear gl g2 
g = chebba2(g);
a_c2 =  g\V2’; %iniital guess for parameters 
clear nr_c2 g V2 G2
% COMPUTE THE EXPECTED PAYOFFS 
Ev =  zeros((n*n*2+n)*n,2); %initial guess for v-fn
load M il
Ml =  chebba2(Mll); 
save(’M l’,’M1’); 
clear M il
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Ev(:.l) =  Ml*a_cl; 
clear Ml
load M22
M2 = chebba2(M22); 
save(’M2’,’M2’); 
clear M22 
Ev(:,2) -  M2*a_c2; 
clear M2
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 6. MAIN LOOP
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
it -  0;
while it<maxit
% WHEN XI IS CLOSED 
load nr 
load kap 
load H
nr_cl =  [nr(:,l)+H(:,l) nr(:,2)-kap2+H(:.2)];
clear nr kapl kap2 H
[VI, Gl] = max(nr_cl’ +  delta*Ev’);
VI -  VP;
Gl =  G l’; 
clear nr_cl
[gl g2] -  gfuncsfi(Gl); 
g =  gl+g2; 
clear gl g2 
g_cl =  chebba2(g); 
clear g
aokLcl =  a_cl;
load x a_cl =  aold_cl - (x-delta*g_cl)\(x*aold_cl-Vl); 
clear x g_cl
% WHEN X2 IS CLOSED 
load nr 
load kap 
load H
nr_c2 =  [nr(:,l)-kapl+H(:,2) nr(:,2)+H(:,l)]; 
clear nr kapl kap2 H
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[V2,G2] =  max(nr_c2: + delta*Ev’);
V2 =  V2’;
G2 -  G2’; 
clear nr_c2
[gl g2] =  gfuncsfi(G2);
g =  gl+g2; 
clear gl g2 
g_c2 =  chebba2(g); 
clear g
aold_c2 =  a_c2; 
load x
a_c2 = aold_c2 - (x-delta*g_c2)\(x*aold_c2-V2); 
clear x g_c2
% ERROR
error 1 =  max(abs(a_cl-aold_cl));
error2 =  max(abs(a_c2-aold_c2));
if error 1 < tol
ind =  1;
break
end
aux(itH-l) =  error 1:
figure 
hold on
plot (it,error 1, ’o’,it, error2, ’+ ’)
xlim([l,it+2])
hold off
load Ml
Ev(:,l) =  Ml*a_cl; 
clear Ml 
load M2
Ev(:,2) =  M2*a_c2; 
clear M2
it =  it+1;
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 7. SIMULATION
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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x lt =  zeros(time+l,M); 
x2t =  zeros(time+l,M); 
xt =  zeros(time.M); 
h it  =  zeros (time, M); 
h2t =  zeros(time,M); 
ht =  zeros(time.M): 
nrt =  zeros(time.M);
Tt =  zeros(time,M); 
indl =  zeros(time,M); 
ind2 =  zeros(time.M); 
ind3 =  zeros(time,M); 
ind4 =  zeros(time,M); 
ind5 =  zeros(time,M); 
ind6 =  zeros(time,M);
Ht =  zeros (time, M); 
tt =  zeros (timed-1,M);
x lt(l,:) =  Kl*xlO; % initial condition 
x2t(l,:) -  K2*x20; 
t =  linspace(0,n,n+1)’; 
tt( 1,:) =  0;
[zl,xl] =  chebn(mxlmin.xlmax); % nodes 
[z2,x2] =  chebn(n,x2min,x2max); % nodes
G1 — reshape(Gl.n,(n*n*2+n));
G2 -  reshape(G2,n,(n*n*2+n));
% AREA INITIALLY CLOSED
if initarea = =  1
state — 1;
ind4(l,:) =  1;
elseif initarea = =  2
state =  2;
ind4(l,:) =  2;
end
clear Ev VI V2 b dl pirn zl z2 
for j =  1:M 
for i =  l:time
[aux,indl(i,j)] =  min(xl<xlt(i,j)); 
[aux,ind2(i,j)] =  min(x2<x2t(i,j));
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if x lt(i.j) > =  max(xl)
indl(ij) =  n;
end
if x2t(i,j) > =  max(x2)
ind2(i,j) -  n;
end
if state = =  1
ind4(i+l j)  =  Gl(ind2(i,j),(indl(i,j)-l)*n+ind3(i,j)); 
elseif state = =  2
ind4(i+l,j) =  G2(ind2(i,j),(indl(i,j)-l)*n+ind3(i,j)); 
end
if state = =  1
h2t(i,j) =  gam*x2t(i,j); 
ht(i,j) =  h2t(i,j);
nrt(i.j) -  P*ht(i,j)"(l-l/ep) -c2*gam*K2;
if nrt(i,j) < =  0 n r t( i j )  =  0;
ht(i,j) -  ((c2*gam*K2)/p)^(l/(l-l/ep));
end
x lt(i+ l,j) =  min(xlt(i,j) + zu(indz(i,j))*rl*xlt(i,j)*(l-xlt(i,j)/Kl)
+ . . .
phi*Kl*(x2t(i,j)/K2 - xlt(i,j)/K l),K l);
x2t(i+l,j) =  min(x2t(i,j) +  zu(indz(i,j))*r2*x2t(i,j)*(l-x2t(i,j)/K2) 
phi*Kl*(x2t(i,j)/K2 - x lt(i,j)/K l) gam*x2t(i,j) + (1-
nsh(i,j))*x2t(i,j)*ssize,K2);
Tt(i,l) =  phi*Kl*(x2t(i,j)/K2 - xlt(i,j)/K l); 
xt(i,j) -  xlt(i,j) +  x2t(i,j);
elseif state ==- 2 
hlt(i,j) =  gam*xlt(i.j); 
ht(i,j) =  hlt(i,j);
nrt(i,j) =  p*ht(i,j) (1-1/ep) -cl*gam*Kl;
if nrt(i,j) < =  0 
nrt(i,j) =  0;
ht(i,j) -  ((c2*gam*K2)/p)~(l/(1-1/ep)); 
end
xlt(i+ l,j) =  min(xlt(i,j) +  zu(indz(i,j))*rl*xlt(i,j)*(l-xlt(i,j)/Kl)
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+ . . .
phi * K1 * (x21 (i, j ) /  K2 - x lt(i,j)/K l)
gam*xlt(i,j) +  (l-nsh(i,j))*xlt(i,j)*ssize,Kl);
x2t(i+l,j) = min(x2t(i,j) + zu(indz(i,j))*r2*x2t(i,j)*(l-x2t(i,j)/K2)
phi*Kl*(x2t(i,j)/K2 - xlt(iJ)/K l),K 2);
Tt(i,l) -  phi*Kl*(x2t(i,j)/K2 - xlt(i,j)/Kl); 
xt(i,j) -  xlt(i,j) +  x2t(i,j);
end
if ind4(i+l,j) '=  ind4(i j)  
tt(i+ l,j) =  0; 
if ind4(i+l,j) = =  1
kap =  kapO*(p*hlt(i,j)~(l-l/ep)-cl*gam*Kl); 
elseif ind4(i+l,j) = =  2
kap =  kapO*(p*h2t(i,j)~(l-l/ep)-c2*gam*K2); 
end
nrt(i,j) -  nrt(ij) - kap;
elseif ind4(i+l,j) = =  ind4(i,j)
tt(i-hl,j) =  min(tt(i,j)+l,200); 
nrt(i,j) =  nrt(ij);
end
if ind4(i+l,j) = =  1 
state = 1;
elseif ind4(i+l,j) = =  2
state =  2;
end
end
end
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E n d n o tes
1 There is a large number of previous studies on marine reserves. Compre­
hensive literature reviews are provided by for example Guenette et al. (1998), 
Hilborn et al. (2004) and Grafton et al. (2005).
2 There are few but important previous studies looking at temporary fishing 
closures. For example see Hilborn and Walters (1992), Guenette et al.(1998) 
and Costello and Polasky (2008). Not on marine reserves but Costello and 
Polasky (2004) also study the dynamic site selection problem on protecting 
biodiversity.
5 A similar specification is utilized in a recent study on fishery profits of ma­
rine reserves (White et al. 2008). An alternative specification of the harvest 
function is to make 6 a control variable so that the level of harvest is optimally 
cont.roled over time. However, this will increase the computational burden.
4 See Judd (1998) and Miranda and Fackler (2002) for the technical details.
5 Leigh et al. (2006) estimated that the exploitable biomass fell to approxi­
mately 60 per cent in the late 1990s.
6 See Appendix for Matlab code.
' In a deterministic environment the biomass at the maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) at site i is B lMSY = With the given parameter values
BIisy  = 288.04 and M S Y  = 31.68.
8The difference between the fixed reserve and no-reserve cases, in which the 
harvest is optimally controlled, is shown in Grafton et al. (2006b).
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C h a p te r  4
C on n ec tiv ity  and  netw ork  s tru c tu re  of 
m arin e  reserves
In tro d u ctio n
Terrestrial and marine landscapes are typically heterogeneous. The spatial 
characteristics of the biological system and connectivity between adjacent sites 
are fundamental factors in natural resource management (Wilen 2007). An im­
portant issue is how to implement an ecologically and economically effective 
control of resource use, while taking into account the different diffusion process 
and spatial heterogeneity in the management area. In fisheries management, 
one widely recognised spatially explicit strategy is the use of marine reserves, 
which typically restricts resource development and fishing activities in pro­
tected areas. In the past two decades a number of studies have addressed the 
ecological and economic impact of creating a reserve. In this paper we develop 
a spatial bioeconomic model to address issues of marine reserve design in the 
presence of a large negative shock in fish stocks.
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One of the most important insights from previous studies is that, in various 
cases, the use of reserves will provide a win-win situation in which the ecosys­
tem and economic payoffs are both improved (Grafton et al. 2006b; Sanchirico 
et al. 2006; Worm et al. 2006; White et al. 2008). However, whether marine 
reserve management is implemented in an effective way and produces expected 
policy outcomes largely depends on the design of marine reserves. A misplaced 
reserve increases the cost of management and will not achieve a desirable out­
come (Sala et al. 2002; Botsford et al. 2003; Gerber et al. 2003; Roberts et al. 
2003; Balmford et al. 2004). Another important insight from previous studies 
is that marine reserves work particularly well in the presence of large variations 
in the marine environment (Lauck et al. 1998; Grafton et al. 2006b; Costello 
& Polasky 2008). Creating a non-fishing area hedges against uncertainty in 
the ecosystem and maintains biodiversity as well as fisheries.
Using a stochastic dynamic optimisation framework, we focus on the connec­
tivity and network structure of marine reserves in regulated fisheries. The 
linkage between different sites is crucial to determining the effectiveness of re­
serves management. Roberts (1997) and Shanks et al. (2003), for example, 
show that reserves need to be established close enough together to effectively 
maintain biodiversity. This is especially the case when the fish dispersal pro­
cess is passive such as in coral reefs. Reserves that are close guarantee the 
successful movement of larvae and spawning biomass and also enhance biodi­
versity conservation.
In addition, because neighbouring fisheries benefit from reserves, biological as 
well as economic connectivity between neighbouring sites is a crucial factor in 
determining the benefit from creating a reserve (Roberts et al. 2001). The 
use of reserves is economically optimal if and only if the dispersal benefit 
from protected areas is greater than the cost of reduction in fishing waters.
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Connectivity between adjacent sites is determined by different factors, such as, 
the nature of fish dispersal, spatial heterogeneity in the economic and biological 
characteristics as well as the presence of stochastic variation and input/effort 
distribution (Sanchirico & Wilen 2001; Smith & Wilen 2003; Grafton et al. 
2006b; Sanchirico et al. 2006; Costello & Polasky 2008).
A study that shares a similar motivation to this study is Sanchirico (2005). 
He analyses how different assumptions about the connectivity between two 
discrete spaces influences the benefit from closing a fishing ground in open 
access fisheries. Considering three different properties of biological production, 
he illustrates the parameter regions where creating a reserve yields a win-win 
situation. Similar to his study, this paper also employs a discrete space model. 
Our study is different from Sanchirico (2005) in that we use a metapopulation 
model with four discrete patches and investigate not only the connectivity but 
also policy outcomes with different network structures of reserves.
Although most bioeconomic models in previous studies restrict the spatial 
dimension within two discrete patches, partly due to the model tractability, a 
two-patch (reserve-fishing ground) model cannot deal with the spatial structure 
of marine reserves. In this paper, we develop a bioeconomic model with four 
discrete patches, incorporating a feedback approximation method developed by 
Sirakaya et al. (2006). Using the model we investigate the following research 
questions: to what extent do the direct/indirect linkages between reserves and 
fishing grounds matter for policy outcomes of marine reserves; how does the 
buffering effect of reserves change in different network structures of reserves; 
and to what extent does the spatial heterogeneity in biological and economic 
parameters affect the nature of fish migration across adjacent sites.
Another difference between Sanchirico (2005) and this study is that, instead 
of open access, we consider a fishery where the level of harvest is optimally
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controlled over time. It is important to know to what extent the connectivity 
and network structure of reserves affect policy outcomes in regulated fisheries. 
Creating a non-fishing area itself does not solve the common-pool resource 
problem. Thus, the use of reserves is not a panacea for every management 
failure (Allison et al. 1998; Hilborn et al. 2004) and, in open access fisheries, 
reserves would not provide a win-win situation in many instances (Hannesson 
2002). Controlling fishers’ behaviour and incentives is a key for successful 
fisheries management (Grafton et al. 2006a).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 we develop a 
spatial bioeconomic model of marine reserves. The computational strategy 
to simulate the model is also discussed. The parameter values for the model 
simulations are extracted from a previous study, Grafton et al. (2006b), in 
the Pacific halibut fishery, which is described in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 
we simulate the economic and biological outcomes of marine reserves under 
different network structures as well as different assumptions about the spatial 
heterogeneity. Section 4.5 provides concluding remarks.
T he m odel
P op u lation  dyn am ics
The paper employs a metapopulation model with four sites, in which each 
site represents a discrete space (Figure 4.1). The linkages between adjacent 
sites are modelled by the transfer function Tij(xlv x{). which captures the fish 
transfer from one site to another. Here, x l and xi denote the fish stock in sites 
i and j  and z, j  G N  =  (1, 2,3,4).
Time is discrete, indexed by t G N. The population dynamics in site z with its
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Figure 4.1 M odel image
SITE 2SITE 1
SITE 4 SITE 3
adjacent sites j  at time t are modelled as:
i
x \+i = x t ~  K  +  z9t rlx\ ( l  -  Tij(x) ~ s  (x l  xu 4 )  > if site i is °Pen; and
j
i
x \+i = x \ +  z9rlx\ ( l  -  ^  Ty (x) -  5 (xz, xJu zst ) , if site i is closed
j
(4.1)
where x\ is the fish stock and K 1 is the carrying capacity in site i. The first term 
is the fish escapement in each period. If site i is a fishing ground, the fish stock 
is exploited by the harvest level h\>  0, while h\ = 0 if a reserve is established 
on the site. The second term is the density dependent growth function with 
site specific intrinsic growth rate, rl and zf represents stochastic variation in 
fish growth at site i. The growth uncertainty is specified as z9 =  l +  (2it — l)e, 
where u is a uniformly discretised grid. The term e determines the size of 
variations and lies between 0 and 1, indicating from 0 per cent to 100 per cent 
variation (Sethi et al. 2005). It is assumed that z9 follows a Markov process 
with the same transition probabilities between each state. The third term.
Y^j i^j T i j ( - ) ,  is the net fish fiow between neighbouring sites i and j. The last 
term S(-) is a negative shock function.
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Transfer function
The transfer function captures different forms of connectivity between adja­
cent sites. This term thus represents the fish dispersal pattern and the volume 
of fish flow from one site to another. Assume that the fish flow depends on 
the relative population density between adjacent sites. The density dependent 
dispersal process is a common specification in bioeconomic modelling (for ex­
ample, Conrad 1999; Sanchirico & Wilen 2001; Grafton et al. 2006b). Here, 
we specify the transfer function as:
7 y(x ) =  ro « /C ( 1Ö if i and j  are adjacent, (4.2)
where is the transfer coefficient for connecting sites i and j. We assume 
that the carrying capacity in each site is the same and then the transfer func­
tion becomes my' (xJ — x l) where mu is the fraction of the difference in the 
population density between sites i and j.
N eg a tiv e  shock
The marine environment faces different types of large negative shocks. For 
example, the use of fishing gear, such as bottom trawling, increases the risk 
of environmental degradation. Rising and more volatile sea temperatures, due 
to climate change, also increases the uncertainty in fisheries management. In 
this paper the negative shock function, 5(-), captures different forms of a large 
negative shock in the fish population. The function is specified as:
x{: zst )
a\x\ for t £ [£*, r] 
|o  for t tfz [C, r]
(4.3)
where we assume that the size of a negative shock is proportional to the stock 
level that is determined by parameters a\ at time t. A negative shock arrives
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at time t* and persists until time r  . We assume that 1 > a t* > a t*+i > • • • > 
a T_i > a r > 0, hence the size of shocks diminishes over time and eventually 
vanishes.
In this paper we consider two scenarios of negative shocks: negative shocks are 
realised only in the harvested population; and shocks are realised in both the 
reserve and harvested populations. We define T C A/" as a set of the sites that 
are open for fishing. Then, for the first scenario, the specification of the shock 
function is S(-) = a ltx\, i £ T and. for the second scenario, S(-) =  oc\x\, i £ Af.
D ynam ic op tim isa tion  m odel
Suppose that the regulator aims to maximise the discounted net profit from 
fishing over an infinite time horizon. The regulator's control variable is a total 
catch limit in each fishing ground. Then, the net profit function at time t is 
specified as:
where h = JT  ^ hl is the total harvest. The term p(-) is the inverse demand 
function and c(-) is the cost function. We define the inverse demand and cost 
functions as:
where <5 is the constant price elasticity of demand and p and c* are the parame­
ters. Note that if the elasticity is positive (0 < 5 < oo), then the demand curve 
is downward sloping (jph < 0), while the demand curve is horizontal if 8 —> oo. 
Hence, this demand form can capture the different types of demand. Also note 
that cx < 0 and cxx > 0. In other words, the harvesting cost decreases in the 
abundance of fish and the decreasing rate is progressive.
Combining the model developed above, the regulator’s objective function and
(4.4)
P(') = Pht 1/d and c(-) =  c ' /x\ (4.5)
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constraints are:
oo
J = maxE ßtTit (4-6)
t= o
subject to <
if site i is open;
ryv'i   /y*^  I /y .4 /y » 4
X t+ 1 _  X t ' ~t ' X t
if site i is closed;
/y»^    r f*4 I rr*'i ry4
X t+ 1 — X t ' ~t ' X t
4  =  ^ ( o ) ,\
Zsi( 0) Zs0
+ Tj ’t Tij(x ) -  S (x\, -
+ Y f '  T a ( x )  ~  s  (4 . 4 . 4 )
= 2s(0)and i = 1, 2, 3,4
(4.7)
where E is the mathematical expectation operator, ß is a discounting factor 
and J  is the sum of the expected discounted net profit. Therefore, the reg­
ulator maximises the sum of the expected discounted net profit from fishing 
and is subject to the population dynamics in both the reserve and harvested 
populations. Also, initial conditions for the state variables are given.
Sim ulation  stra tegy
Using Matlab and its Genetic Algorithm and Direct Search toolbox we simu­
late the developed model.1 In this model there are six state variables, x \  i = 
1 , . . . ,4,  z9 and £s. Thus, the traditional direct and indirect numerical ap­
proaches, such as discretisation and projection methods, are not applicable 
due to the curse of dimensionality problem. We alternatively adopt a simula­
tion method developed by Sirakava et al. (2006). In their approach, a feedback 
policy function, hl = <f>(Tf, D), is parameterised by a neural network where 
Tt is the vector of the input variables at time t and Q is the vector of con­
nection and bias weights of the neural network, respectively. Neural networks 
are flexible non-linear function forms to approximate unknown functions.2 The 
function consists of single or multiple layers of networks that connect the out­
put and inputs. This paper employs the following feedforward network with a
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logistic function:
4>(r(, q ) =
r ;
T m in  T  ("7m ax r) m in )
l  +  exp(-T?)
—  + 3^^ 3« + + 5^^ 5* + ^6^6t + V *  (^ -8),2-pl .2 tU 2 i-l .2 T-l , 2 i - l
r 1L it
r°1 it
1 +  exp(-u)}r “ +  v} )
=  (*1, x t ,4 - 9,tl *t
With this specification, the output, <f>. is bounded between 7m*n and 7max, 
where 7min =  0 and 7max — K l since here the output is the harvest in site i. 
Given a different set of initial conditions for the state variables, T°0 G T(0) =  
(xj, . . .Xq, Zq, Zq), the sum of the discounted net profit is computed. The 
connection and weights are trained through an iteration procedure to maximise 
the sum of the discounted net profit.
The underlying logic of this algorithm is that if the trained feedback policy 
rule maximises the sum of the discounted net profit, it must also maximise the 
profit over a range of initial conditions. Thus, the objective function in the 
optimisation problem becomes
T
j =  Y ,  Y .P « *  (4-9)
r^ Giyo) t= 0
To approximate the optimal feedback rule we employ a genetic algorithm.'3 The 
genetic algorithm is a stochastic search optimisation method that is motivated 
from the evolution process in biology, while incorporating genetic concepts, 
such as, chromosome, generation, mutation and crossover. We first construct 
a fixed-size population, Y  =  (y1>.. -, Dm ), where ym, m — 1 , . . . ,  M, is called 
individual (or chromosome) in the population. The objective function is eval­
uated by each individual. The larger the size of the population, the wider the 
domain to be searched for the optimal feedback policy rule. The policy rule
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is then trained through an iteration procedure, called generation. In each it­
eration individuals producing higher values of the objective function are likely 
to be selected to produce new individuals for the next generation. The new 
generation consists of three types of children, elite, crossover and mutation.
Elite children are the individuals who have the highest values of the objective 
function in the current generation. They survive to the next generation. In 
the crossover process, those ym with higher values of the objective function are 
selected to reproduce individuals for the next generation. There are practically 
infinite ways to reproduce children in this step. In this paper we draw a random 
binary vector and the children are created correspondingly. In the mutation 
process, an old individual, ym, is replaced by an alternative individual through 
a random draw from a Gaussian distribution. This guarantees a wide range 
of searching domains and avoids convergence in a local optima. Through the 
iterative reproduction procedure, those individuals with higher values of the 
objective function survive but weaker ones vanish.
P acific  h a lib u t fishery
The model developed in the previous section is applied to the Pacific halibut 
fishery in the North Pacific Ocean. Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) 
is a longlived large flatfish and the halibut fishery has been one of the most 
important and valuable fisheries for the last 120 years in the region. The 
commercial halibut fishery is mainly conducted in Alaska, British Columbia 
and the North West Pacific, engaged in by Canada and the United States. The 
major fishing gear is a long-line (Herrmann 1996).
Since 1923 the fishery has been overseen by the International Pacific Hal­
ibut Commission (IPHC: originally named International Fisheries Commis-
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sion), conducting stock assessment as well as providing scientific reports and 
recommending measures to manage and protect the industry. Similar to the 
experience in other modern fisheries, as the fishing capacity improved and the 
market expanded, new entrants were attracted to the fishery and the ‘race-to- 
fish' was expeditiously induced (Wilen & Homans 1998). The fishing season 
had, consequently, been reduced to very short periods, especially from the 
mid 1970s to the mid 1990s. For example, a fishing ground in Alaska was 
open for only two days in 1994. Given this regulated open-access problem 
(Homans & Wilen 1997), the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
(DFO) implemented an individual vessel quota (IVQ) program in the British 
Columbia halibut fishery in 1991. The North Pacific Fisheries Management 
Council (NPMFC) also introduced an individual fishery quota (IFQ) program 
for Alaskan fishery in 1995. After implementation of the policy, the fishing 
season in Alaska is stable at 245 days (Herrmann & Criddle 2006)
The economic payoffs from establishing a reserve in the fishery is analysed in 
Grafton et al. (2006b). The parameter values for the biological and economic 
variables for the model developed in the previous section are extracted from 
their study. The intrinsic growth rate r is 0.2985 and the carrying capacity K  
is 0.9631 million pounds. The parameter, p. in the inverse demand function 
is 0.07 and the price elasticity of demand is 1.23. In the absence of adequate 
data, the cost parameter c is set at 0.03 and the transfer coefficient m = 0.1. 
The variation in the growth uncertainty is described by e = 0.15 and the time 
discounting rate is 5 per cent.
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Simulation Results
Network structures, negative shocks and connectivity
In this section we consider the two different network structures of marine re­
serves (Figure 4.2) and their policy outcomes. In the first structure, a reserve 
is directly connected with the other reserve and also with a fishing area, but, 
in the second structure, one reserve and the other reserve are only indirectly 
connected through a fishing area. In other words, each reserve and fishing area 
is more closely linked in Structure 2. Comparing these two network structures 
allows us to investigate to what extent policy outcomes of marine reserves vary 
in the direct and indirect linkage between the reserve and harvested popula­
tions.
W hen negative shocks are only realised in fishing grounds. Figure 4.3 
illustrates the net profit from fishing and the total biomass over time under 
the two network structures. Three large negative shocks are introduced at 
times 30. 55 and 80 and the size of the shocks are 030 =  0.08, 055 =  0.12 
and ago =  0.16, respectively. Different values of a are applied here so that the 
sensitivity of the results is analysed. In Figure 4.3. the shocks are only realised
Figure 4.2 Network structures
2.1 Structure 1 2.2 Structure 2
Fishing area
Fishing area Fishing area
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Figure 4.3 N et profit and biomass over tim e 
(negative shocks are realised only in the fishing areas)
4.3.1 Net profit 4.3.2 Total biomass
in fishing grounds and not in reserves. Hence, this is a case in which a major 
risk for environmental degradation is due to site-specific events such as fishing 
activities.
The figure shows that when the reserve has a stronger connectivity with the 
harvested population (Structure 2), the net profit is greater both at the steady 
state and following negative shocks. The difference in the total biomass be­
tween the two structures is, on the other hand, not substantial. Also, the larger 
the size of the shock, the greater the difference in the net profit following the 
shocks between Structures 1 and 2. This is because the closer linkage between 
the reserve and harvested populations enhances the buffering effect associated 
with the economic efficiency against the impact of negative shocks. In other 
words, since the fishing ground in Structure 2 is more closely and directly con­
nected with the reserve than that in Structure 1, the population density across 
different sites is smoothed through the fish dispersal faster. The total profit in 
Structure 2 is consequently greater than that in Structure 1.
Since the population density is smoothed through fish migration, the difference 
in the total fish population between Structures 1 and 2 is not clear in Figure 
4.3.2. However, the two network structures have different biological effects
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Figure 4.4 B io m a ss in fish ing areas and reserves over tim e  
(n eg a tiv e  sh ock s are realised  on ly  in th e  fish ing areas)
4.4.1 Fishing areas 4.4.2 Reserves
Structure 2 .
in the reserve and fishing ground, respectively. Figure 4.4 shows that the 
biomass in the fishing ground is higher and the impact of negative shocks on 
the harvested population is smaller in Structure 2. On the other hand, in the 
reserve, Structure 1 has a higher biomass and the reserve population is less 
impacted by the shocks. This is because the closer the linkage between the 
reserve and fishing ground, the greater the fish migration from the reserve to 
harvested areas. Furthermore, the greater the fish migration, the faster the 
population density among adjacent sites is smoothed. Consequently, the level 
of fish abundance between the reserve and fishing ground in Structure 2 is 
less differentiated than that in Structure 1. With a density dependent fish 
dispersal process, fish flows from high density to low density areas. Therefore, 
although a weaker connectivity between the reserve and harvested populations 
and a stronger linkage across the different reserves would maintain the reserve 
population better, there is a trade-off with the population density in the fishing 
ground and also with overall economic efficiency.
W hen negative shocks are realised in the whole environment. Figure 
4.5 similarly illustrates the net profit from fishing and the total biomass under 
the two network structures, but negative shocks are now realised in both the
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reserve and fishing ground. It is important to analyse different scenarios of 
negative shocks, because policy outcomes of marine reserves depend on the 
nature of large variations in fish populations (Grafton et al. 2006b; Costello 
& Polasky 2008).
The figure shows that, at the steady state, the net profit is greater when the 
reserve and harvested populations have a stronger connectivity. Also, due 
to the closer linkage between the reserve and harvested populations, there is 
less time for the trajectory of the net profit to recover, following the shocks. 
These results are similar to those in Figure 4.3. In contrast, the buffering effect 
immediately after the shocks is different from the previous case where negative 
shocks are only realised in the fishing ground. Figure 5 shows that, following 
the shocks, the net profit in Structure 2 is now temporally smaller than that 
in Structure 1, especially when the size of the shock is relatively large. This is 
because the closer connectivity in Structure 2 generates greater fish dispersal 
from the reserve to harvested areas and, in turn, this maintains a higher total 
profit than that in Structure 1. However, the negative shocks now occur in the 
whole environment and the population density falls in both the reserve and 
fishing ground simultaneously. The smoothing effect is consequently weaker 
and thus the buffering effect against the impact of negative shocks is also 
weaker than when the shocks are realised only in the fishing ground. As a 
result, the net profit in Structure 2 is temporally smaller than that in Structure 
1 .
When negative shocks occur in the whole environment, the biological effect in 
the reserve and fishing ground is also different from the previous case where 
the shocks are realised only in the fishing ground. Figure 4.6 illustrates this. 
Since negative shocks are now realised not only in the fishing ground but 
also in the reserve, the impact of the shocks on the reserve population is
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Figure 4.5 N et profit and biomass over tim e
(negative shocks are realised in both the fishing areas and reserves)
4.5.1 Net profit 4.5.2 Biomass
0 0325
0.032
0.0315
0 0305
00295
00285
0.0275
Figure 4.6 Biomass in fishing areas and reserves over tim e 
(negative shocks are realised in both the fishing areas and reserves)
4.6.1 Fishing areas 4.6.2 Reserves
Time Time
greater than the previous case. This is especially the case in Structure 1 
where the reserve and harvested populations have a weaker connectivity. The 
lower fish migration from the reserve to the harvested areas in Structure 1, in 
other words the slower smoothing effect in the population density, mitigates 
the impact of negative shocks less. Furthermore, compared to the previous 
case, Structure 2 has a weaker buffering effect associated with the harvested 
population. This is because the smoothing effect is weaker when the shocks are 
realised in the whole environment, whereas Structure 2 mitigates the impact 
of negative shocks better when the shocks occur only in the fishing ground.
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Figure 4.7 C h an ges in th e  c o n n e c tiv ity  b e tw een  ad jacen t s ite s  
(n eg a tiv e  sh ock s are realised  on ly  in th e  fish ing  grounds)
4.7.1 Changes in T12 and T34 in Structure 1 4.7.2 Changes in X23 and T41 in Structure 1
Transfer coefficient
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C o n n e c t iv ity . The results in the previous subsections show how the direct 
and indirect linkages between the reserve and harvested populations affect 
policy outcomes of marine reserves and how they respond to a large negative 
shock in fish populations. Depending on the network structure of reserves, 
the strength and nature of fish dispersal as well as the speed of smoothing 
the population density between adjacent sites are different. The role of di­
rect/indirect linkages between adjacent sites is also emphasised in Figures 4.7 
and 4.8. They illustrate how the value of the objective function changes in 
the transfer coefficient when negative shocks are realised only in the fishing 
ground and in the whole environment, respectively.
In Figures 4.7.1. and 4.8.1, we vary the value of the transfer coefficient between 
the reserve and fishing ground (X12 and X34), while holding the linkage across 
the fishing grounds as well as the reserves constant. Alternatively, in Figures 
4.7.2 and 4.8.2, the connectivity across the fishing grounds as well as the 
reserves is changed (T23 and X41). Note that, here, only results in Structure 
1 are presented, since we are interested in the difference between the changes 
in the direct (Ti2 and X34) and indirect (X23 and T41) linkages between the
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Figure 4.8 Changes in the connectivity between adjacent sites 
(negative shocks are realised in both the fishing grounds and reserves)
4.8.1 Changes in 7i2 and T34 in Structure 1 4.8.2 Changes in T23 and T41 in Structure 1
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Transfer coefficientTransfer coefficient
reserve and harvested populations. It is clear from Figures 4.7 and 4.8 that 
the direct linkage between the reserve and harvested populations is a more 
important factor in determining the economic efficiency of marine reserves. 
As the value of the transfer coefficients (7\ 2 and 734) increases, fish dispersal 
from the reserve to harvested areas is enhanced, consequently increasing the 
economic return. However, a strong linkage between similar types of sites (T23 
and T41) is less likely to improve the economic efficiency, since it would not 
enhance fish dispersal between adjacent sites.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that a close connectivity that aug­
ments fish dispersal from the reserve to the harvested populations is important 
to maintain the economic efficiency of marine reserves. In other words, the dis­
tance from the reserves to the fishing grounds has to be close enough to ensure 
sufficient fish flows. Otherwise, the cost of reductions in fishing waters would 
be greater than the benefit from creating a reserve. Therefore, with a density 
dependent fish dispersal process, since fish flows from a high dense to low dense 
area, the direct linkage between the reserve and harvested populations domi­
nates in determining the economic efficiency of marine reserves. Furthermore,
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in a spatially homogeneous environment in the biological and economic char­
acteristics, much dispersal benefit are not gained across the fishing grounds as 
well as the reserves. In the next section, we consider how the results vary in a 
heterogeneous environment.
Spatial heterogeneity of economic and biological parameters
The policy outcomes of marine reserves are, in part, determined by the spatial 
heterogeneity of economic and biological parameters. The connectivity among 
adjacent sites, hence the strength and nature of fish dispersal, depends on 
site-specific characteristics. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate how the different 
scenarios of the spatial heterogeneity in the harvesting cost and intrinsic growth 
rate, respectively, affect economic returns in the fishery. Note that, hereafter, 
negative shocks are realised only in the fishing ground, but the key insights do 
not change if the shocks occur in the whole environment.
Harvesting costs. Harvesting costs are typically different across the fishing 
grounds. They vary depending on, for example, the distance from port to 
fishing grounds, local population density and site-specific ecological conditions. 
Clearly, if the harvesting cost in one fihsing ground is significantly highter than 
that in the other fishing ground, the optimal harvest in the later area is greater. 
Figure 4.9 illustrates how the sum of the discounted net profit changes in the 
cost ratio between the two fishing grounds in the two network structures. 
Here, the only heterogeneity is in the cost parameter, holding everything else 
constant. In Figure 4.9, the greater the value of the cost ratio, the larger the 
heterogeneity between the cost parameters c* and Cj. In other words, when 
the cost ratio is one, the harvesting costs are the same across the two fishing 
grounds. The cost in a fishing ground becomes relatively greater than that in 
the other ground as the cost ratio increases.
Figure 4.9 shows that the discounted net profit increases in the degree of het-
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Figure 4.9 S p atia l h e tero g en e ity  o f econ om ic  p aram eter  (h arvestin g  co st)
4.9.1 Structure 1 4.9.2 Structure 2
Cost ratio (c /c,)Cost ratio (c^/c,)
erogeneity in the cost parameter, holding the average harvesting cost constant 
((q +  C j ) / 2  = c). This is because, as the difference in the harvesting costs 
between the two fishing grounds increases, the optimal level of harvest, hence 
the population density becomes differentiated between the two fishing areas. 
With the differentiated population density over space, fish dispersal are en­
hanced not only from the reserve to harvested areas but also from one fishing 
ground to the other. The dispersal effect, consequently, increases the total 
economic return in the fishery. In other words, when the harvesting costs 
are constant over space, the optimal catch level, thus the population density, 
in each fishing ground is similar. In this case, fisheries do not obtain much 
dispersal benefit from the linkage across the fishing grounds.
This result is important with respect to spatially explicit resource management. 
The result implies that, with a density dependent fish dispersal process, the 
profitability of a fishery is more likely to be improved by imposing a spatially 
explicit catch/effort limit than a constant limit over space. This is not only 
because the spatially explicit catch/effort limit is compatible with the site- 
specific conditions but also because it enhances the dispersal benefit. In other 
words, a trade-off in the decision to harvest today is not only with a decision
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F igu re  4 .10  S p atia l h e tero g en e ity  o f b io log ica l p aram eter  (in tr in sic  grow th  rate)
4.10.1 Structure 1 4.10.2 Structure 2
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to leave the fish for future generations but also with a decision to leave the fish 
for the next period to enhance the dispersal benefit through smoothing the 
population density over space. Also, in an extreme case where the harvesting 
costs across the fishing grounds are significantly differentiated, the optimal 
level of harvest at one of the sites is a corner solution, hl = 0, so that it is 
optimal to close the fishing ground (Sanchirico et al 2006). Moreover, if the 
harvesting costs are further differentiated from this point, because the fishing 
ground with the higher harvesting cost is now closed, the total harvesting cost 
further decreases which, in turn, increases total economic returns.
Intrinsic growth rates. The growth rate of fish is another important factor 
in determining policy outcomes of marine reserves and the spatial heterogeneity 
in the growth rate influences the connectivity between adjacent sites. Previous 
studies, for example, show that, as the growth rate increases either in the 
whole environment or in the reserve, the optimal size of reserves decreases 
(Grafton et al. 2005) and the parameter region for a win-win situation, where 
both the economic and biological conditions are improved, becomes restrictive 
(Sanchirico & When 2001 and 2002). This is because the higher the intrinsic 
growth rate, the greater the resilience of the biomass and the smaller the 
reserve is necessary to maintain populations.
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To see how the spatial heterogeneity in the intrinsic growth rate affects policy 
outcomes, we vary the value of the growth rate in the reserve and fishing 
ground, respectively, in Figure 4.10. The figure shows that fish growth in 
the fishing ground is more important to determine the economic efficiency of 
marine reserves than in the reserve. This is because, the higher the growth rate 
the greater the resilience of the harvested population, which is more profitable 
to harvest in the area where growth rates are relatively high. This result is 
consistent with previous studies, including Sanchirico et al. (2006). They show 
that unless the dispersal benefit from the reserve to harvested populations is 
sufficient to outweigh the returns from harvesting in the site with high growth 
rates, it is optimal to close the area where the growth rate is relatively low. 
In other words, whether which area to be closed for fishing depends on the 
relative benfits of fish dispersal and production. This result is also relevant to 
the buffering effect of marine reserves, since fishing grounds are exposed to a 
higher risk of environmental degradation than reserves due to human activities. 
Opening a site with higher growth rates enhances the resilience of the system 
against a negative shock.
C onclud ing  rem arks
To address issues on the connectivity of marine reserves, we develop a spatial 
bioeconomic model, which incorporates a simple network structure of reserves. 
Then we solve and simulate the model using a feedback approximation method. 
We find that, if the connectivity between the reserve and harvested popula­
tions is weak and reserves are close together, then it maintains the reserve 
population better; however, there is a trade-off with the spatial distribution 
of fish populations and also with economic efficiency in the fishery. We also 
show that fish dispersal from the reserve to harvested areas are enhanced in
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a heterogeneous environment. This is because, with heterogeneous ecological 
and economic conditions, the optimal control of resource use is not constant 
over space. With a spatially explicit harvest/effort control, population density 
across adjacent sites is also not uniform which, in turn, enhances the disper­
sal effect from the reserve to harvested areas. Therefore, a spatially explicit 
control outweighs a non-spatial one not only because it is compatible with 
site-specific conditions but also because it enhances the dispersal effect.
This paper employs a density dependent fish dispersal process, which is a 
common specification in the literature, but the biological dispersal process is 
typically subject to different factors, such as, sea temperature, currents and 
natal habitat. Other spatial bioeconomic models employ, for example, unidi­
rectional and life-stage dependent dispersal processes (Brown & Roughgarden 
1997; Sanchirico & Wilen 1999) However, we note that the main insights in 
this paper would be applicable in natural resource management as long as a 
similar kind of smoothing effect is in presence in neighbouring populations. For 
future research, it would be worth analysing trade-offs across the connectivity, 
biological and economic efficiency as well as the resilience of marine reserves 
while incorporating a model with multiple nodes and clusters of the reserve 
and harvested populations.
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A p p e n d ix
M a tla b  code
%%%% conn.m
%%%%
%%%% This program solves a dynamic bioeconomic model 
%%%% by using a feedback approximation method.
%%%% See Sirakaya et al (2006) in CE
%%%%
%%%% To run this program Genetic Algorithm and 
%%%% Direct Search Toolbox is required.
%%%%
clear all 
close all 
clc
options =
gaoptimsetfPopulationSize’AO/PopInitRange’.f-lOOTOO],
1 MutationF ciT, { ©mutationgaussian. 1,0.7},
’Generations1.1000, ’StallGenLimit’, inf.,StallTimeLimit,, inf);
[x fval] -  ga(@fishl3_r_3_tl,38,[],[],[],[],[],[],[],options);
beta =  0.95; 
delta = 1.23;
P -  -07; 
c =  .03; 
r l  =  .2985; 
r2 -  .2985; 
m = .1;
K =  0.9631; 
size =  0.5; 
kl =  size/2; 
k2 =  (1-size)/2; 
k3 =  (l-size)/2;
Kl =  K*kl;
K2 = K*k2;
K3 =  K*k3;
K4 =  K-K1-K2-K3; 
load epidemic
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time =  100;
% DEFINE VARIABLES 
x lt =  zeros(time+l,l); 
x2t =  zeros(time+l,l); 
x3t =  zeros(time+l,l); 
x4t =  zeros (time-fLl); 
xt =  zeros (time+1,1); 
h it = zeros(time,l); 
h3t =  zeros(time,l); 
lit =  zeros(time,l); 
nrt =  zeros(time,l); 
t l  =  zeros(time,l); 
t2 =  zeros(time,l); 
t3 =  zeros(time,l); 
t4 =  zeros(time,l);
xlO -  .5; 
x20 -  .5; 
x30 =  .5; 
x40 -  .5;
x lt( l ,l)  =  xlO*Kl: 
x2t(l,l) =  x20*K2; 
x3t(l,l) =  x30*K3; 
x4t(l,l) -  x40*K4;
w =  x;
for i = l:time
xt(i) =  xlt(i) -f x2t(i) +  x3t(i) +  x4t(i);
hlt(i) = min(max(0 4- (Kl-0)*
(l/(l+exp(-(w(l)*l/(l+exp(-(w(2)*xlt(i)+w(3))))
+w(4)*l/(l+exp(-(w(5)*x2t(i)+w(6))))
+w(7)*l/(l+exp(-(w(8)*x3t(i)+w(9))))
+w(10)*l/(l-r-exp(-(\v(ll)*x4t(i)-fw(12))))
+w(13)*l/(l+exp(-(w(14)*z(i)+w(15))))
+w(16)*l/(l+exp(-(w(17)*sl(i)+w(18))))+w(19))))),0),Kl);
h3t(i) =min(max(0 +  (K3-0)*
(l/(l+exp(-(w(20)*l/(l+exp(-(w(21)*xlt(i)+w(22))))
4-w(23)*l/(l+exp(-(w(24)*x2t(i)+w(25))))
+w(26)*l/(l+exp(-(w(27)*x3t(i)+w(28))))
+w(29)*l/(l+exp(-(w(30)*x4t(i)+w(31))))
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+w(32)*l/(l+exp(-(w(33)*z(i)+w(34))))
+w(35)*l/(l+exp(-(w(36)*sl(i)+w(37))))+w(38))))),0),K3);
ht(i) = hlt(i) + h3t(i);
nrt(i) =  p*ht(i)"(l-l/delta)- c/xlt(i)*hlt(i) - c/x3t(i)*h3t(i); 
x lt( i+ l)  =  xlt(i) + rl*z(i)*xlt(i)*(l-xlt(i)/K l) +  m*Kl*(x2t(i)/K2 - 
x lt(i)/K l) +  m*Kl*(x4t(i)/K4 - x lt(i)/K l)- sl(i)*xlt(i) - hlt(i); 
x2t(i+l) =  x2t(i) + rl*z(i)*x2t(i)*(l-x2t(i)/K2) - m*Kl*(x2t(i)/K2 - 
x lt(i)/K l) +  m*K2*(x3t(i)/K3 - x2t(i)/K2);
x3t(i+l) =  x3t(i) +  r2*z(i)*x3t(i)*(l-x3t(i)/K3) - m*K2*(x3t(i)/K3 -
x2t(i)/K2) +  m*K3*(x4t(i)/K4 - x3t(i)/K3) - sl(i)*x3t(i) - h3t(i);
x4t(i+l) =  x4t(i) +  r2*z(i)*x4t(i)*(l-x4t(i)/K4) - m*K3*(x4t(i)/K4 -
x3t(i)/K3) - m*Kl*(x4t(i)/K4 - x lt(i)/K l);
tl(i) =  m*Kl*(x2t(i)/K2 - x lt(i)/K l);
t2(i) =  m*K2*(x3t(i)/K3 - x2t(i)/K2);
t3(i) =  m*K3*(x4t(i)/K4 - x3t(i)/K3);
t4(i) =  m*Kl*(x4t(i)/K4 - x lt(i)/K l);
end
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E n d n o te
1 See Appendix for Matlab code.
2 For the details of the theory of neural networks, see for example Hertz et al.
(1991) .
3 For the detailed discussion on genetic algorithm, see for example Holland
(1992) .
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